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ANDREW P. MORRISS*

Lessons from the Development of
Western Water Law for Emerging
Water Markets: Common Law
vs. Central Planning

P

opulation growth, particularly in the arid regions of the
world, has pushed water resource questions to the forefront.
Even conservative estimates of the world's population project
that it will reach 8,043,000,000 by 2030, an increase of more than
two billion people from 1998.1 Such an increase will result in
greater demands on water resources, and water shortages, real or
predicted, are present or forecast across the globe.2 Fantastic,
and expensive, schemes such as towing icebergs to areas with
water shortages are regularly proposed; 3 countries are pouring
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Galen J. Roush Professor of Business
Law & Regulation, Case Western Reserve University and Senior Associate, Political
Economy Research Center, Bozeman, Montana. A.B., 1981, Princeton; J.D., M.
Pub. Aft., 1984, The University of Texas at Austin; Ph.D. (Economics), 1994, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Substantial portions of this article were completed
while I was a Visiting Scholar at the Political Economy Research Center, Bozeman,
Montana, a visit made possible by the generosity of the Earhart Foundation and the
Board of the Political Economy Research Center, and while I was an Olin Fellow at
the Cornell Law School, a visit made possible by the generosity of the Olin Foundation, Cornell Law School and Prof. Jonathan Macey. Thanks to Gordon Bakken,
Christopher Bryant, Juliet Kostritsky, Roger Meiners, Robert G. Natelson, and
Bruce Yandle for comments, to Cindy Hill-Graham for superb secretarial support,
and to the staffs at the American Heritage Center, Laramie, Wyoming and the Wyoming State Archives, Cheyenne, Wyoming for assistance with documents.
I See World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000, tbls.2.1-2.2, available at
www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2000/people.htm.
The World Bank and Water, available at http://
2 See World Bank,
www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/pb/pbwater.htm ("By 2025 about 48 countries will
[experience water stress or scarcity] and the number of people adversely affected
will exceed 1.4 billion, the majority in the least developed countries."); see also Sandra Postel, Dividing the Waters, 100 M.I.T.'s TECH. REV. 54 (1997), availableat 1997
WL 24415262.
3 See, e.g., David Walmsley, Water Firm May Float Icebergs to Britain, DAILY
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desalinization plants.4
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solutions such

as

Over one hundred years ago, the arid lands of the western

United States underwent rapid population growth, at rates equal
or faster than the arid regions of the world are experiencing today.5 In a region long derided as the "Great American Desert," 6
the new residents of the West found themselves in a region with

vastly different water resources from those they knew. Their demands on those resources were new as well-both hydraulic mining and irrigation expanded water use to a scale unknown in the
more settled, wetter eastern regions. In response to these condi-

tions and needs, westerners modified familiar institutions to deal
with the scarcity of water. The common law of prior appropriation mixed new rules suited to the new conditions with older institutions of jury trials and common law legal development. This
system flourished through the first fifty years of the development

of the American West. Only at the end of the nineteenth century
did a centralized solution appear-the "Wyoming system" developed by Elwood Mead in that state's 1889 constitution.
Mead's legacy is a system that began with the rules developed
by the common law, the rules of prior appropriation, but replaced crucial parts of that system with central planning. In place
of juries, Mead's system substituted state bureaucrats. In place of
full private property rights,7 Mead's system substituted public
TEL.,

Sept. 26, 1997, at 17, available at 1997 WL 2340935;

MARC REISNER, CADIL-

ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 121 (rev. ed.
1993) (noting plans to import water from Alaska to Colorado River basin). Such
schemes regularly surface but generally are abandoned due to poor economics. Iceberg water, on the other hand, is already being exported from Greenland. See Iceberg Corp. Forms Joint Venture to Export Greenland Water, 11 INDUS. ENV'T 8, Oct.
1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 7448655.
4 See Jad Isaac, The Essentials of Sustainable Water Resource Management in
Israel and Palestine, 22 ARAB STUD. Q. 13, 26, Apr. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL
20465255 (describing desalinization plant costs as one dollar per cubic meter of
water or more).
5 T.H. WATKINS, GOLD AND SILVER IN THE WEST 40 (1971). California, for example, grew from a number measured in the hundreds in 1848 to more than 100,000
in 1849 and more than 200,000 by the end of 1852. Id. Wyoming grew from 9,000 in
1870 to 93,000 in 1900; Montana grew from 21,000 in 1870 to 243,000 in 1900. 1 THE
STATISTICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 30, 37
(1975).
LAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND

6 LEwIS ATHERTON, THE CATILE KINGS 1 (1961).
7 1 WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN
STATES 137 (1971). Property rights in water generally are conceptualized as "strictly
usufructuary rights to take the water from the stream" rather than ownership of the
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ownership and private rights at the sufferance of the state. As
summarized by water law expert Wells Hutchins in his comprehensive 1971 treatise,
[m]ost of the Western States provide by statute for State control over the acquisition of appropriative rights to the use of
public waters and over the distribution of water to those entitled to receive it, and vest these duties in a centralized group
of water administrative officials. Many States also provide
special procedures for the adjudication of water rights; in most
of these States, State officials play an active part. Provisions
comprise a mafor these administrative and judicial functions
8
jor part of the State statutory water law.
Indeed, the extent of Mead's legacy can be seen in the modern
notion that the "genealogy" of the Secretary of the Interior is
seen as "a matter of high importance" because of his power over
water allocations. 9
The development of the common law of prior appropriation
and its displacement by a system of central planning have much
to teach us about allocating water rights. Contrary to the standard story of water law in the West, 10 Mead's system was not
simply the antidote to chaos. As discussed below, Mead's system
arose because it served the interests of the businessmen who
made up Wyoming's powerful range cattle industry by removing
water disputes from the local courts and juries, which were the
one state institution the cattlemen did not control. Viewed in
context, therefore, western water law's development includes a
story about two competing systems of water rights, one built
around common law and private property rights and the other
water itself. Id. Nonetheless it is more convenient to speak of property rights in
water and most of the water law literature does so. For a discussion of the modern
classification of water rights as forms of property, see id. at 151-56.
8 Id. at 7.
9 REISNER, supra note 3, at 261. Reisner recounts numerous examples of individual bureaucrats' power affecting individual rights. See, e.g., id. at 282 (stating that
the head of Colorado Water Conservation Board was "stubborn, vindictive, and a
bully,
but in Colorado, where water was concerned, he was a king").
10
See, e.g., ROBERT B. KEITER & TIM NEWCOMB, THE WYOMING STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 180-81 (1993).
Wyoming's unique distributive administrative scheme was designed to reform the abuses of the territorial water system. The constitutional convention delegates intentionally created an expert administrative board to make
initial water appropriation and distribution decisions rather than relying
upon the courts which were believed to have poorly administered the territorial water system.
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around central planning and bureaucratic fiat. The former system offers a viable alternative to the central planning approach
dominant today, one that supports the growth of modern water
markets.
Unallocated water is a commons. As Bruce Yandle and I have
noted elsewhere, there are many paths out of the commons: regulatory regimes, state property, and private property. 1 The
dominance of the central planning approach to water concentrated attention on the first two. The history of western water
law suggests that we should reexamine the private property
approach.
The common law aspect of western water law is important for
another reason as well. Many of the arid regions experiencing
the greatest stress from population growth lie in the developing
world. As the increasing value of water creates incentives for the
development of water markets, there also will be an increased
incentive for national governments to stymie that development
by imposing state controls to appropriate the increasingly valuable water resources. That is likely to result in destruction of valued local institutions and legal rules.
The story of water in the American West shows that political
intervention is unnecessary. Local institutions and rules could be
the basis for a legal regime sufficient to deal with water issues
that arise. The importation of central planning regimes for water
can thus not only lead to the allocation of water in ways that
harm the interests of indigenous peoples, 2 but also can contribute to the destruction of customary legal systems, which themselves form a valuable part of indigenous people's cultural
heritage.' 3 Failing to resist the attempts by special interests at a
water grab may thus leave both the indigenous people's land and
culture high and dry. Protecting customary legal regimes' water
law, on the other hand, may help control water sensibly.
This Article examines the development of water law in the
11 See Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights:
Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 123, 130-33 (2001).
12 See REISNER, supra note 3, for multiple descriptions of how water planners in
the United States destroyed local economies, including Native American communities, for the benefit of large agribusiness. See, e.g., id. at 186-91 (describing impact
of Corps of Engineers' Oahe Dam on Fort Berthold Indian Reservation).
13 There are, of course, problems that require national attention, but many of
those problems have more to do with bargaining across jurisdictions than with allocation of water within jurisdictions.
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West and suggests reliance on a common law rather than a central planning, regulatory regime. Part One describes the common law water rights system and its development in the West.
Part Two surveys how courts in Montana and Wyoming dealt
with water law issues in the nineteenth century. Part Three
traces the development and spread of the "Wyoming System" of
central planning for water. Part Four compares the common law
and central planning as devices for allocating water. Part Five
concludes by drawing lessons for modern water markets and
other areas of environmental policy and for the development of
water markets from the common law experience with water
rights.
I
THE COMMON LAW WATER RIGHTS SYSTEM

When Americans moved into the arid lands of the West, they
created a new system of water law to replace the English common law doctrine of riparian rights used in the eastern states.
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming all
embraced the doctrine of prior appropriation as either a complete replacement for or addition to traditional common law riparian rights.1 4 The change in substance of the law was not,
however, immediately accompanied by a change in the institutions that implemented the law. Although procedural innovations were introduced in a number of states to simplify water
rights cases, the states and territories of the West relied primarily
upon the same mix of common law courts and customary legal
institutions for resolving water rights disputes under the prior appropriation doctrine as they did for resolving other legal disputes. The western states and territories thus began their prior
appropriation regimes relying on the same institutions used in
the East to handle riparian rights questions.
A dramatic change began in 1889, when Wyoming adopted its
14 Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming adopted "pure" prior appropriation systems. California, Kansas, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington recognized both ripa-

rian and prior appropriation rights in various forms. See 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7,
at 192 & tbl.3. California has the most extensive riparian component. See id. at 188
("In no other Western State has the riparian owner been accorded greater privileges
in respect to his water right than in California.").
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state constitution. This constitution centralized ownership and
control of water in the state government.1 5 Promoted as an engineering solution to the purported chaos of the common law, the

"Wyoming System" then spread to most other states in the
West.' 6 From that time, western water law moved away from individual choice, markets, and common law and toward bureaucracy and planning.

7

Why did Wyoming abandon the decentralized, common law
system of water rights in favor of central planning? Why did the

Wyoming system spread to other prior appropriation states? The
short answer is that the Wyoming system was created by the
powerful interests that controlled Wyoming's territorial and state
governments. The new water law regime was a weapon in their
long-running war against farmers whose homesteads interfered
with the cattle ranchers' ability to control land. The system then

spread to other states as interest groups saw the opportunity to
bring water rights under their control and as a result of federal
pressure to centralize as a precondition to gaining access to federal water projects. I elaborate on this explanation below.
Water law and policy often are cast as the fundamental organizing principle of the American West. In some accounts, the

bringing of water to the arid lands is billed as a triumph over
recalcitrant nature. Innovative institutions like the prior appropriation doctrine are celebrated. 18 More recently, however,
western water law has been cast as a central part of an oppressive
15 Wyo. CONST. art. VIII. Colorado initiated water law reform before Wyoming
but Colorado's innovations did not alter the fundamental character of the system as
did Wyoming's. See 3 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 215 ("In Colorado there is no
State administrative supervision over the acquisition of appropriative water rights in
water of watercourses."); James M. Klebba, Water Rights and Water Policy in Louisiana: Laissez Faire Riparianism, Market Based Approaches, or a New Managerialism?, 53 LA. L. REV. 1779 (1993) ("[A] statute-based administrative permit system
in all appropriation states (except for Colorado) now regulates the acquisition of
new rights."). But Colorado does claim public ownership. See CoLO. CONST. art
XVI, § 5.
16 See infra Section III.D. More recently, Wyoming has retreated slightly from
the planning model, adopting a judicial system as an alternative to the administrative
system. See A. Lynne Krogh, Water Right Adjudications in the Western States: Procedures, Constitutionality,Problems & Solutions, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 9, 23
(1995).
17 See TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING
THE INVISIBLE PUMP 71 (1997).
18 See, e.g., WALTER PRESCOTT WEBB, THE GREAT PLAINS 437 (1931) (terming
development of prior appropriation "one of the remarkable transmutations in
American jurisprudence").
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class system. For example, Donald Worster, Hall Distinguished
Professor of American History at the University of Kansas has
recently argued that the West
can best be described as a modern hydraulic society, which is
to say, a social order based on the intensive, large-scale manipulation of water and its products in an arid setting .... [That
order] is increasingly a coercive, monolithic and hierarchical
system, ruled by a power elite based on the ownership of capital and expertise. Its face is reflected in every mile of concentrated wealth, technical virtuosity, discipline, hard work,
popular acquiescence, a feeling of resignation and necessitybut one cannot find in it much of what Thoreau conceived as
freedom.1 9
In Worster's view, the West is a hierarchy built around command of water: aridity dictates hierarchy which dictates oligarchic control.
This Article argues that both these perspectives fail to come to
grips with one of the most important aspects of water law in the
West. Rather than simply a body of rules to be compared to the
riparian rights system east of the Mississippi or to a blank canvas
for engineers to fill with dams and canals, the arid West offered a
diverse set of responses to aridity. Political struggles over the
appropriate institutions to control water resources largely shaped
these responses. The initial response was not hierarchy but common law, flexible, decentralized and open. This system functioned well and there was thus nothing inevitable to the
development of central planning of water resources.
These struggles over water were not class struggles, but rather
an expression of special interest politics and regulatory capture.
It was not the manipulation of water but the manipulation of
government about water that marked the West. Control of water
was (and is) more valuable in the West than in the East because
of water's greater relative scarcity. Control thus was worth contesting through the government, but this contest was (and is) no
different from other special interest struggles. This struggle centered on defining the issues in water law disputes and determining how and where those disputes would be resolved. The great
divide in this struggle was the replacement of the common law
system of dispute resolution with a centralized, administrative
system. Rather than resting on the common law of property and
19 DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH
OF THE AMERICAN WEST

7 (1985).
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contract, water law became a system in which the saying "contracts are made to be broken" epitomizes the attitudes of water
rights holders.2 0 The crucial distinction is thus not between ripa-

rian and prior appropriation but between common law and central planning.
To understand this difference requires considering how the

common law dealt with western water rights. The common law
system consisted of three parts: sets of rules, dispute resolution
mechanisms, and rule generation mechanisms. To be properly
evaluated, all three must be considered.
A.

Common Law Rules

The differences between the sets of rules in eastern and western states have been the subject of extensive scholarship and

commentary and so need only brief discussion here. Two major
sets of rules arose out of the common law. The first, the riparian
system, developed in England and in the eastern United States
and was often carried west with other parts of the common law.21
Unlike other parts of the common law, however, the transplanted
riparian system did not always flourish in the arid states and territories. In its place grew the second new system of rules, pioneered by customary legal institutions 22 but recognized by the
common law legal system as legitimate rules: 23 the prior appropriation system. Some states adopted pure prior appropriation
rules, while others developed mixed systems of riparian and prior
appropriation rules.2 4
supra note 3, at 301 (quoting Arizona farmer in the 1980s).
v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 746-51 (Cal. 1886) (describing impact of 1850
statute adopting common law and so requiring riparian rights to be recognized);
Edwin W. Young, The Adoption of the Common Law in California, 4 AM. J. LEGAL
HIsT. 355 (1960) (describing circumstances surrounding adoption of c6mmon law
over civil law).
22 See Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of
Western Water Law In Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 347, 349 (1989) (listing Native American practices,
Spanish and Mexican colonial practices, Mormon practices, and miners' practices as
sources for prior appropriation).
23 See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882) (noting that
right existed prior to legislation).
24 See Table 3 infra. The mixed systems were less effective at creating property
rights in water. See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 17, at 56 ("The inability of
lawyers and judges to put aside riparian precedent and the resultant mixture of riparian with prior appropriation doctrine led to a confusion that stifled the effective
establishment of private property rights in water.").
20 REISNER,
21 See Lux
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Common law rules defined water rights, set out the means of
acquiring and losing those rights, and provided principles for
resolving disputes among rights holders. Many of these rules,
like rules in other common law areas, took the form of general
principles rather than detailed "legalistic" rules such as modern
administrative regulations. The content of the legal rules is discussed below. The important point here is that while rules could
appear to be sharp and clear in the abstract (e.g., riparian rights
attach only to riparian lands), they were often blurry in context
(e.g., what lands are riparian?) and required thorough development of the specific factual context of a dispute to sharpen them.
Applying the common law, at least in the nineteenth century, was
25
an exercise in factual classification.
B.

Common Law Dispute Resolution

The common law system was a dispute resolution system built
around jury trials. Nineteenth-century trial practice differed in a
number of ways from modern practice, but many of the essentials
were similar. Disputes were brought before courts through lawsuits between two or more parties. After limited discovery, particularly compared to trial practice today, and a period of motion
practice, the case was tried to a jury. After hearing the evidence,
the jury was charged by the trial court judge as to the law and
retired to consider the evidence. After a jury verdict, an appeal
could be taken to the state or territorial supreme court (generally
there were no intermediate appellate courts in the West) and, in
some cases, from there to the U.S. Supreme Court. The crucial
distinction lay in the division of labor between the judge and
jury. Fact questions were for the jury; legal issues for the judge.
At the option of either of the parties, therefore, a lay jury could
be asked to decide the fact questions critical to the functioning of
the common law.
C.

Common Law Rule Generation

The rule generation mechanism consisted of judges and the appropriate legislature. Rules were generated by the courts
through the production of precedent. Although there were fewer
precedents then than there are today, precedent played a far
25

See

JAMES C.

CARTER, THE PROVINCES OF THE WRITTEN AND UNWRITTEN

26 (1889) (describing common law as a based on close scrutiny of facts); id. at
28 ("The fact must always come before the law.").
LAW
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more important role in judicial decision making than it does now.
Moreover, judges regularly looked beyond their own jurisdic-

tions for precedents. In western water law, they frequently
looked to California, for example.2 6 A reasonably substantial

stock of precedents under the prior appropriation system thus
developed quite rapidly.

In examining precedents to determine a case, courts took a
constrained view of their powers. Modern observers often deride
this approach as "mechanical," "formalistic," and narrow.

7

It is

important to recognize, however, that the constraint imposed by
the limited scope available for legal innovation was seen as an

advantage for judges who believed in the law as a science built on
application of precedent to facts.2 8 Such contracts were a vital
part of the common law.
The legislature's role in common law rule generation was also
important. Although the volume of legislation generally was far

less then than it is today, and although western territorial and
state legislatures generally met infrequently and for short periods, the legislature was often the source of innovative means of
resolving legal problems. This role was consistent with nineteenth-century views on the role of the legislature in the common

law process: to correct the mistakes of the courts and to innovate
where the courts, bound by precedent, could not.29
Common law rules thus came from two sources. First, and

most frequently, they arose from the courts' examination of the
26 California alone produced volumes of water law precedent. Between its organization in 1850 and the landmark case of Lux v. Haggin in 1886, the California Supreme Court had decided more than a hundred water law cases. Eric T. Freyfogle,
Lux v. Haggin and the Common Law Burdens of Modern Water Law, 57 U. COLO.
L. REV. 485, 497 (1986).
27 See, e.g., id. at 518.
28 On the nineteenth century view of the law, see JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW
AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES

(1956). I will rely here on the writings of James C. Carter, a prominent nineteenth
century attorney and common law advocate who wrote a great deal defending the
common law. Legal historian William Wieck termed Carter the "epitome" of American lawyers at the end of the nineteenth century. WILLIAM WIECK, THE LOST
WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT

97 (1998).

supra note 25, at 18 ("From time to time, progress and change in
social conditions require corresponding changes in the law, which can be affected
only through the instrumentality of statutes .... "). A good historical example of
this that many lawyers may remember from their first year property classes is the
English statute Quia Emptores which made land held in fee simple freely alienable
without the landholder's lord's consent in 1290. See THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETr,
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 558 (1958).
29 CARTER,
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facts of specific cases and were expressed in judicial opinions.
Second, common law rules came from legislative enactments designed to correct courts' mistakes and supplement court proceedings with procedural aids.3"
The common law as a rule generating system had four key features. First, it was a set of rules that developed incrementally in
most instances. Rules would be adjusted largely as the result of
the discovery of relevant new facts, not in response to an outcry
for change. Thus, as noted common law advocate James Carter
put it, rules were laid down "provisionally only."3 1
Second, common law rules grew out of custom. As the modern edition of Black's Law Dictionary definition still suggests,
the common law is
[tihe body of those principles and rules of action, relating to
the government and security of persons and property, which
derive their authority solely from usages and customs of immemorial antiquity, or from the judgments and decrees of the
courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages and
customs, and, in this sense, particularly the ancient unwritten
law of England.32
Third, common law addressed only questions brought to it by
the litigants themselves-courts had no ability to go out and seek
to bring particular matters before themselves. A tangled doctrine or messy set of facts could not be resolved, therefore, until
parties brought the matter to court. Nonetheless, once a dispute
33
was brought to the courts, they had no choice but to decide it.
Fourth, common law was more than the content of legal rules.
30 Note that this did not mean that legislatures had free reign to revise the substance of the common law while maintaining it as common law; generally legislatures
played a far more limited role. Legislatures could, of course, substitute statutory
schemes for the common law by wholesale preemption of it, but they could also act
in aid of it through enacting general supplemental rules. The point is that presence
of limited legislation does not necessarily indicate an absence of common law.
31 JAMES C. CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAW 25
(1884).
32 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 250-51 (5th ed. 1979). Black's also gives a more
modern definition: "Those principles, usage and rules of action applicable to government and security of persons and property which do not rest for their authority
upon any express and positive declaration of the will of the legislature." Id.
33 As common law advocate James C. Carter put it:
if a controversy arise between two men concerning the ownership of property, and there be no statute upon the subject, the unwritten law must,
nevertheless decide it. No matter how novel the question, it must be determined. It would not be endurable that one man should hold unchallenged
possession of property to which another honestly laid claim, for the reason
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As one common law partisan termed it, the common law was "a
particular system of reason."3 4 Rules were discovered through
this reasoning process, a process based on classification of facts.35
As a Colorado judge summarized, "[t]he principles of the law are
undoubtedly of universal application, but some latitude of construction must be allowed to meet the various conditions of life
36
in different countries.
D.

The Common Law as a System

Since the nineteenth century, common law has fallen into some
disrepute.37 To the extent we think of the common law today, we
tend to think of it as judge-made law-rules that courts can alter
at will.38 This was not always so, however. For many nineteenthcentury Americans, including prominent lawyers, the common
law was a system of rules, which judges discovered but did not
make.3 9 In examining the law in the nineteenth century it is necessary to consider the common law as nineteenth-century Amerithat the case was so novel as to render it difficult to determine to whom it
justly belonged.
CARTER, supra note 31, at 34-35.
34
JOEL PRErrISS BISHOP, COMMON LAW AND CODIFICATION

3 (1888).
In correspondence about an earlier draft of the article, Professor Robert Natelson elaborated on this point: "judges 'discovered' rules, they didn't make themjust as scientists discovered the rules of natural worlds." Natelson also commented
that describing this as a process of invention was also appropriate (noting that the
Latin root of "to invent" is "inverire," to find): "An inventor makes (finds) a tool to
solve a problem, but in accordance with pre-existing scientific principles, e.g.,
gravity."
36 Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 553 (1872) (Hallett, C.J.).
37 Consider the public impression of common law decisions as expressed by the
late Frank Zappa: "Case law is what happens when a stupid judicial decision from
one place gets cited as a 'legal precedent' forming the basis for another stupid judicial decision somewhere else-like a computer virus." FRANK ZAPPA, THE REAL
FRANK ZAPPA BOOK 327-28 (1990).
38 This can lead to ridiculous outcomes. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372
(N.J. 1971). ("Property rights serve human values .... Title to real property cannot
include dominion over the destiny of persons the owner permits to come upon the
premises" and so the right to exclude must be limited); see also Andrew P. Morriss,
Property, 4th Ed. by Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 997,
1005-07 (1999) (book review) (critiquing State v. Shack).
39 See Andrew P. Morriss, Codification and Right Answers, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
355, 376-79, 387-89 (1999); Andrew P. Morriss, Legal Argument in the Opinions of
Montana TerritorialSupreme Court Chief Justice Decius S. Wade, 1 NEV. L. REV. 38
(2001) [hereinafter Legal Argument]. Further evidence of this attitude can be seen
in California's foundational water rights case, Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 751 (Cal.
1886), where the California Supreme Court boldly declared, "[n]or do we know of
cases where the courts in the United States have undertaken to change the common
law [of England with respect to water]."
35
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cans were likely to do, since it is their version of the common law
that was the alternative to the Wyoming system of central planning.4" J. Willard Hurst offered a more accurate description of
the nineteenth-century common law, arguing it was a practical
process based on "working principles" rather than on grand theories. These principles were: (1) "the legal order should protect
and promote the release of individual creative energy to the
greatest extent compatible with the broad sharing of opportunity
for such expression" and (2) "the legal order should mobilize the
resources of the community to help shape an environment which
would give men more liberty by increasing the practical range of
choices open to them and minimizing the limiting force of circumstances."4 1 These principles shaped the common law's development by focusing judicial attention on facilitating private
actors' actions rather than regulating individuals' conduct toward
politically determined goals.
The features of the common law method of rule generation
described above are important because they played a key role in
the common law water rights system. Water rights would be defined incrementally by the legal system, since the courts would
not adjudicate any rights until there was a dispute that the parties
could not resolve outside the courts. In most cases, the rules
would be elaborated only slightly, if at all, in response to the facts
the parties brought before the court.
The parties' agreements and customs, as well as the customs of
the community, would also play a significant role in determining
the content of the rules applied. As the California Supreme
Court described it in an early water rights case: "Courts are
bound to take notice of the political and social condition of the
country which they judicially rule. '4 2 Customary rights might
sometimes be "crude and undigested, and subject to fluctuation
and dispute," but when "a universal sense of necessity and propriety have so firmly fixed" them, "they have come to be looked
40 If they were mistaken, of course, then one would wish to search for the "real"
causes of their behavior. I am thus rejecting the critique of the nineteenth century
common law made by Morton Horwitz and others that it was really about class

struggle. See

MORTON

J. HORWITZ, THE

TRANSFORMATION

OF AMERICAN

LAW

1780-1860 (1977). This is not the place to debate that hypothesis. For a discussion of
this topic, see RICHARD A.

EPSTEIN,

PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY:

RECON-

CILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 1-2 (1998) (summarizing

and critiquing criticisms of laissez faire).
41 HURST,
42

supra note 28, at 10.

Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 151 (1855).
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upon as having the force and effect of res judicata.""
These disputes would be decided piecemeal in many instances,
where not every potentially relevant party appeared before the
court in a given action. Even today, opponents of the common
law often criticize this approach, noting that it could lead to inconsistent decisions.4 4 The case-by-case approach had its advantages, however. Not having to adjudicate all claims meant that a
court could avoid many issues and focus only on the relative
claims before it, significantly lowering the costs of the proceeding
and likely raising the accuracy of determinations. 5 As the Nevada Supreme Court noted in responding to a disgruntled litigant
who argued that his opponent had gotten more than the opponent deserved: "[Y]et it makes no difference if [the facts] did
[support the additional claims]. It is a matter that does not concern appellant. If he received all the rights that belonged to him,
he cannot complain, even though it is a fact that plaintiff received
46
more than he was entitled to."
It is important not to exaggerate the piecemeal nature of the
litigation, however. Nineteenth-century courts could, and routinely did, deal with cases involving relatively large numbers of
claimants.4 7 In one case, an Idaho plaintiff served approximately
950 defendants in one of the largest water rights adjudications of
the first century of prior appropriation.4 8
Finally, the common law method of rule generation involved
the application of the "particular system of reason" to the facts
43 Id. Legislatures, too, had to take custom into account, as the Colorado Supreme Court recognized in its landmark 1882 decision in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch
Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882). When the Colorado legislature created a statute governing
division of water supplies in times of shortages, it required apportionment be done
"with a due regard to the legal rights of all." Id. at 448. The court found that this
phrase was recognition of the preexisting common law water rights held by prior
appropriators. Id.
44 See, e.g., Krogh, supra note 16, at 15 (attributing "multiple actions and incon-

sistent judgments" to the common law);

JAMES R. KLUGER, TURNING ON WATER
WITH A SHOVEL: THE CAREER OF ELWOOD MEAD 18 (1992) (noting Mead's frus-

tration with "chaotic nature of Wyoming water laws").
45 See Krogh, supra note 16, at 10 (noting that agencies and courts involved in
"ambitious attempts" to comprehensively adjudicate water rights "are deeply frustrated by the complexity and resultant length and cost of these adjudications").
46 Dick v. Caldwell, 14 Nev. 167 (1879).
47 See, e.g., Huston v. Leach, 53 Cal. 262 (1878). This decision is an otherwise
unremarkable and brief water rights opinion whose heading notes that there were
fifty-one parties on one side and fifty-four in total.
48 Utah Construction Co. v. Abbott, Equity No. 222 (D.E. 1923), described in
Krogh, supra note 16, at 15.
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rather than resort to a more utilitarian analysis of the impact of
rules.

The result of the combination of these factors is that the common law is extremely difficult for special interest groups to capture.4 9 Although he intended it as a criticism, Prof. Eric
Freyfogle aptly characterized the role of the nineteenth-century

court as "a conservator and a protector, not a social engineer."5
E.

Riparian Rights in the Common Law

As developed in Britain and applied in the United States, the

nineteenth-century riparian doctrine had five key features. First,
the right stemmed from ownership of land on the banks of a

body of water.51 Second, the right of each landowner was equal
to the right of every other landowner along the same body of
water. 52 Third, the landowner had no property right in the water
itself but merely a usufructory right.5 3 Fourth, the use by the
landowner had to be "reasonable." 5 4 Fifth, the right could be
grant, condemnalost only through loss of the land or through
55

tion, or prescription of the right itself.

This system produced complex factual and legal disputes. For
example, parties might disagree over which lands were riparian,
since there was no precise rule as to how far from water land
could be and still be "riparian. ' '5 6 Whether land was riparian de49 Consider California's landmark water rights case, Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674
(Cal. 1886). The case involved a dispute between a party claiming riparian rights
and parties claiming appropriation rights. The trial court decision in Lux was issued
during the heat of the 1884 political campaigns and popular opinion was firmly on
the side of the appropriators, with public meetings and resolutions endorsing their
position. Shaw, infra note 64, at 454. The lengthy opinion of the California Supreme Court (110 pages in the Pacific Reporter), issued two years later, nonetheless
firmly established riparian rights. "The question was settled by [Lux] and the riparian right has never since been disputed." Id. at 455. For accounts of the political
background of the Lux litigation, see Freyfogle, supra note 26, at 485, and M. CATHERINE MILLER, FLOODING THE COURTROOMS 10-22 (1993).
50 Freyfogle, supra note 26, at 518.
51 Anthony Scott & Georgina Coustalin, The Evolution of Water Rights, 35 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 821, 825 (1995).
52 Id. at 825; see also JOSEPH RAGLAND LONG, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION, COVERING ALL THE STATES AND TERRITORIES, sec. 9 at 19 (1901). I selected the Long treatise as a representative source of late 19th century views on
water law.
53 LONG, supra note 52, at sec. 9 at 19.
54 Id.
55 Id. at sec. 12 at 24.
56 Id. at sec. 14 at 26. Riparian rights accrued only in natural flows of water. No
riparian rights existed, therefore, in either "water flowing in an artificial channel" or
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pended on both the ownership status and on its location.
To be a riparian proprietor, a person must of course own land
bordering on the stream, and hence the owner of a tract of land

which does not itself touch the stream, although it may lie in the
valley of the stream, so that it would be riparian land if belonging
to the same owner, and forming part of the same tract with land
bordering on the stream, is not a riparian owner, and his land is
not riparian land. Hence, the same piece of land might be riparian, or not, according to the situs of the title.57
Simply acquiring land that is itself not riparian but lies next to

a parcel that is riparian, however, did not transform the more
distant parcel into riparian lands, for if that could be done, one

might extend riparian rights indefinitely. 58 Disputes over the status of land and whether there were riparian rights attached to it
could thus be complex.5 9
Disputes also arose with respect to the use, which simply had
to be reasonable; 6° one treatise summed up a legal rule by noting

that "[i]n the nature of things, no precise rule can be laid down as
to what constitutes a reasonable use. ' '6 ' The relative nature of
artificial increases in water flows in a natural channel. Id. at sec. 21 at 39. Thus in
Green v. Carotta, 13 P. 685 (Cal. 1887), for example, the court had to decide whether
a flow of water out of a lake was a "natural" or "artificial" one. Disputes might also
arise over what was the natural flow of a particular water course.
57 LONG, supra note 52, at sec. 14 at 26.
58
Boehmer v. Big Rock Irrigation Dist., 48 P. 908, 910 (Cal. 1897). This case
states that if that were allowed:
it would follow that, if A owned a tract of land upon a stream, his riparian
rights which he acquired by the purchase of that tract would extend to all
lands he might subsequently acquire, no matter from whom, nor under
what circumstances his vendor obtained title, nor how distant from the
stream, provided he owned all the land between the stream and the land so
purchased.
Id.; see also LONG, supra note 52, at sec. 14 at 26-27.
59 See 2 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 47-59 (describing issues in determining
whether lands had riparian rights attached).
60 See, e.g., Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 704 (Cal. 1886) ("[E]ach riparian proprietor
is entitled to a reasonable use of the water for irrigation.").
61 LONG, supra note 52, at sec. 16 at 28. Riparian law also limited the amount of
water any one individual could make use of-no one, for example, could take the
entire flow of a stream (unless by agreement with the downstream riparian rights
holders) because "[any other rule would be entirely subversive of the well-established doctrine that the rights of all the riparian proprietors, as such, are equal." Id.
at sec. 17 at 33. Although riparian owners had equal rights, the quantity of water a
riparian holder was entitled to take varied from case to case. Only
[i]f every riparian proprietor on a given stream owned the same quantity of
land, with the same frontage on the stream, and the same susceptibility to
and need of irrigation, each would be entitled to precisely the same quan-
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riparian rights complicated the determination of reasonableness.
Reasonableness was determined by examining not only the use
made by the riparian owner but also the rights and needs of
downstream riparian owners.62 Again, riparian doctrine required
resolution of fact-intensive disputes with relatively muddy rules.

To sum up, the rules of nineteenth-century riparian doctrine
were relatively vague ("reasonable use", "natural" flows, equal
rights to water held by all users) and led to case-by-case decision
making. Courts had tremendous latitude under these rules: ripa-

rian common law left a great deal to both the judge and the jury
in any given case. As Carol Rose points out, these rules were
well suited to the public good aspects of water used primarily for
nonconsumptive uses such as power generation.63
F. PriorAppropriation under the Common Law
The doctrine of prior appropriation first developed in Califor-

nia, not in the official courts, but among the miners who flooded
the state during the gold rush.64 The doctrine later was recogtity of water for that purpose. These conditions will, of course, rarely, and
perhaps never, be all satisfied in any actual case, but the principle illustrated is the one that must control in all cases.
Id. at sec. 18 at 35.
62 Id. at sec. 16 at 29. This treatise summarized the analysis as follows:
[E]ach proprietor is entitled to use so much, and only so much, of the water
of the stream as may be reasonably necessary for the irrigation of his riparian lands, due regard being had to the rights of the other proprietors, and
all the circumstances of the case. His right is measured by his necessity,that is, he cannot claim any more water than is or would be necessary for
the proper irrigation of his land. But his own necessity is not the only determining factor. His right must be exercised with due regard to the rights
of others.
Id. at sec. 18 at 34. Western courts interpreting riparian rights did allow a greater
degree of diminution of quantity to fall within the ambit of "reasonable use" than
had English or eastern American courts, id. at sec. 16 at 30-31, but still required
each riparian owner to use the water "to do the least possible injury to lower proprietors." Id. at sec. 16 at 31.
63 Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law
Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 292 (1990) ("[E]astern riparian law developed
around an aspect of water use, namely power, that has the aspects of a public good,
quite unlike the individually consumptive uses of water that are characteristic of the
West.").
64 Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search
for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENvTL. L. 919, 920 (1998); see also Lucien
Shaw, The Development of the Law of Waters in the West, 10 CAL. L. REV. 443, 445
(1922); 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 164-65. California is sui generis as a legal
entity. For a thorough analysis of the peculiarities of California's water law development, see Mark T. Kanazawa, Efficiency in Western Water Law: The Development of
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nized in the new state's courts and legislature and in the federal
courts, and spread throughout the arid West.65 The change generally is explained "as the result of the greater scarcity of western
water begetting a more detailed level of property rights definition and hence a more crystalline set of rules."6 6
the California Doctrine, 1850-1911, 27 J. LEG. STUD. 159 (1998). California's
"mixed" riparian/appropriation system developed out of the state's formal adoption
of English common law in 1850, an event that had little or nothing to do with riparian rights. Id. at 164. No American state has ever appeared and grown as rapidly
as California and none has had a legal system built under the strains of sudden
growth and sudden legal change as did California. See Andrew P. Morriss, Miners,
Vigilantes & Cattlemen: Overcoming Free Rider Problems in the PrivateProvision of
Law, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 581, 593-98 (1998) [hereinafter Morriss, Miners,
Vigilantes & Cattlemen]; Charles W. McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and Public Land
Law Development in California,1850-1866: A Case Study of JudicialResource Allocation in Nineteenth Century America, 10 LAW & Soc'y REV. 235, 237 (1975)
(describing rapid population growth). This was particularly true with respect to
water law. For example, the California Supreme Court stated:
It may be said, with truth, that the judiciary of this State has had thrown
upon it responsibilities not incurred by the courts of any other state in the
Union. In addition to those perplexing cases that must arise, in the nature
of things, and especially in putting in to practical operation a new constitution and a new code of statutes, we have had a large class of [mining] cases,
unknown in the jurisprudence of our sister States.
Bear River & Auburn Water & Mining Co. v. New York Mining Co., 8 Cal. 327, 332
(1857). California's legal development, while certainly worthy of study, is not
marked by a similar process to that of the rest of the West. This Article therefore
concentrates on other portions of the West.
65 See Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 456-58 (1878) (stating that the purpose of
1866 mining law was to recognize customary rights in land and water); Drake v.
Earhart, 23 P. 541, 542 (Idaho 1890) (illustrating that prior appropriation was established as local custom, then approved by legislatures and courts throughout the
West); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882) (noting that prior
appropriation rights "existed prior to legislation on the subject of irrigation");
Moyer v. Preston, 44 P. 845, 847 (Wyo. 1896) ("We incline strongly to the view expressed by the Supreme Court of Colorado to the effect that such right and the
obligation to protect it existed anterior to any legislation upon the subject," citing
Coffin.); Clough v. Wing, 17 P. 453, 455 (Ariz. 1888) (declaring that the right to
appropriate was "recognized longer than history and since earlier than tradition");
Tattersfield v. Putnam, 41 P.2d 228, 232 (Ariz. 1935) (observing that prior appropriation "had existed for centuries in Mexico as best suited to our conditions"); U.S. v.
Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 51 P. 674, 679 (N.M. Terr. 1898), rev'd on other
grounds, 174 U.S. 690 (1899) ("[Djoctrine of prior appropriation has been the settled law of this territory by legislation, custom and judicial decision."); 1 HUTCHINS,
supra note 7, at 163 (observing that appropriation rights in Utah "appear[s] to have
been recognized by custom before there was any general law on the subject"); see
also Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Taking the Plunge, in WATER MARKETING-THE NEXT GENERATION xi, xiii (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997).
66 Dean Lueck, The Rule of First Possession and the Design of the Law, 38 J.L. &
ECON. 393, 428 (1995); see also Anderson & Hill, supra note 65, at xiii (noting that
the development of prior appropriation was the result of the greater value of water
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California and some other states created hybrid systems containing both riparian and prior appropriation doctrines. 67 They

did so by varying the rules depending on aridity or applying each
doctrine to different bodies of water (e.g., appropriation applied
only to the water on state or federal public lands.6 8 Texas, for

example, passed a statute providing that prior appropriation applied in the arid portions of the state and water could be appropriated there so long as the appropriation did not deprive
riparian owners of their rights.6 9
Western states soon developed a set of relatively uniform legal
rules governing prior appropriation through the common law.7 °
in the arid west producing greater specificity in developing and specifying water
rights); 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 159 (attributing western water law to "inadequacy of water"); Rose, supra note 63, at 290-93 (examining development of prior
appropriation rule).
67 "Created" may not be the right verb. In Nebraska, for example, the mixed
system arose through interpretation of the statute recognizing prior appropriation
and its effect on pre-existing riparian rights. See, e.g., Clark v. Cambridge & A.
Irrigation & Imp. Co., 64 N.W. 239, 241 (Neb. 1895) ("[R]ight of a riparian proprietor, as such, is property, and, when vested, can be destroyed or impaired only in the
interest of the general public, upon full compensation, and in accordance with established law."); Coffin, 6 Colo. at 447 (stating that riparian rights are inapplicable to
Colorado because "[ijmperative necessity, unknown to the countries which gave it
birth, compels the recognition of another doctrine in conflict therewith"). As those
rights were found to have been vested before prior appropriation began in the state,
they could not be constitutionally divested by the prior appropriation statutes. See
also Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 750 (Cal. 1886) ("We know of no decisions which
intimate that a difference in climatic or geographical conditions may operate to
transfer a right of property from those in whom a right of property is vested by the
common law."). Note the difference between this approach and a pure common law
approach interpreting water rights as evolving into appropriative rights rather than
riparian rights due to differences in the customs of the country. See, e.g., Hill v.
Lenormand, 16 P. 266, 268 (Ariz. 1888) (holding that "[r]iparian rights are the same
here as elsewhere, wherever they apply; but they do not apply where the rights of
prior appropriators have intervened"); Lux, 10 P. at 783 (Myric, J., dissenting)
("The land of the birth of the common law of England had no occasion to consider
or act upon the necessity for irrigation, and appropriation was not within the scheme
of its laws" and so could therefore be changed.).
68 LONG, supra note 52, at sec. 25 at 48-49; Lux, 10 P. at 782-83.
69 See Motl v. Boyd, 286 S.W. 458, 471-72 (Tex. 1926) (tracing history of water law
and discussing 1889 act on riparian rights and appropriative rights). The mixed systems effectively gave a superior right to riparian owners over noncontiguous land
owners solely based on location. See 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 201.
70 Charles Wilkinson, Aldo Leopold and Western Water Law, 24 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 1, 2 (1989) ("For almost all of its history, water law and policy has been
nearly monolithic throughout the American West."); 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at
159 ("With considerable uniformity, these simple but effective principles became
formalized into legal doctrine by decisions of courts and enactments of
legislatures.").
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Under the common law of prior appropriation, there were six
main legal questions to be determined concerning a claim to
water rights.71 First, was the water claimed subject to appropria3
7
tion? 72 Second, was the claimed water validly appropriated?

Third, how much water had been appropriated? Fourth, when
had the appropriation taken place? Fifth, had the claim been lost
through abandonment or forfeiture? Finally, how senior were
the appropriations involved?
To make a valid appropriation required similar, if not exactly
identical, steps in each jurisdiction. The key elements were (1)
actual diversion of water; (2) actual application of the water to a
beneficial use; (3) within a reasonable time; and (4) posting or
recording some notice of the appropriation.7 4
The rules of prior appropriation simplified proof issues by
changing the relevant fact questions. The factual issues likely to
arise in disputes among appropriators were whether a contested
use satisfied the requirement of beneficial use, whether a diversion had taken place, and which right had seniority. None of
these would have presented significant difficulties for lay jurors
or judges. Whether a diversion had been completed or not, for
example, was something that was relatively obvious in many
71 Interestingly, who might make a valid appropriation was generally not an issue,
with most state statutes and constitutions allowing appropriations regardless of
whether the appropriator owned land, was a citizen, or was an Indian. LONG, supra
note 52, at sec. 35 at 66-67. Trespassers seem to have been the only group excluded.
Id.
72 See 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 227-38 (summarizing state doctrines on this
issue). With respect to the determination of whether the water in question was subject to appropriation, disputes seem to have been limited to relatively rare attempts
to divert water directly from a spring, rather than from downstream after it had
entered a river or stream. See, e.g., Ely v. Ferguson, 27 P. 587 (Cal. 1891) (rejecting
claim that water flowing from springs cannot be appropriated). Disputes might also
occur over whether waters were part of a surface stream or not where they first
appeared out of marshes and the like. See, e.g., Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303
(1871) (holding that there is no claim to water percolating beneath the ground of
another); S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Dufour, 30 P. 783 (Cal. 1892); Willow Creek Irrigation
Co. v. Michaelson, 60 P. 943 (Utah 1900) (declaring that the "decisive question" is
whether party who owned land on which a marsh formed also owned water in the
marsh). Most states ultimately addressed this through a statute or constitutional
provision. As Long on Irrigationnoted, "[tjhe provisions are necessarily very similar, extending the right either to the rivers and streams, sometimes qualified as 'natural streams,' of the state, or to running water flowing in a river or stream, or down a
canyon or ravine." LONG, supra note 52, at sec. 31 at 61. This issue was more significant in states like Texas that mixed prior appropriation and riparian rights.
73 See 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 238-69 (discussing who may appropriate).
74 LONG, supra note 52, at sec. 36 at 67-68.
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cases and often resolved the case.7 5 Many court cases over water
rights involved situations where one party had simply taken
water belonging to another.7 6 Resolving such disputes, even
where the thief was able to dress up his actions in a legal theory

later, was not difficult for a court.
The prior appropriation doctrine's elements also conserved judicial resources. 77 The requirement of beneficial use, for example, limited appropriation claims to amounts where there was
proof of the use, something often easier to evaluate than the act
of appropriation.7 8 Parties also often stipulated to many of the
facts. 79 The ease with which courts could handle water disputes

is supported by my review of the transcripts of testimony from a
large water rights case in 1888 in Laramie County, Wyoming Territory, showing that most of the witnesses' testimony covered
only a few typewritten pages and concerned primarily details of
when land and water rights were acquired and the dates of prior
75 See, e.g., Taylor v. Abbott, 37 P. 408 (Cal. 1894) (holding that a claim to a
spring was defeated because claimant had not completed his appropriation).
76 See, e.g., Williams v. Harter, 53 P. 405, 406 (Cal. 1898). In this case, a dispute
occurred when "defendants entered upon plaintiffs said dams and ditch, at sundry
points, and broke and destroyed the same, and placed dams in said ditch, and have
thereby diverted the waters of said springs from plaintiff's ditch." Id.
77 Professor Charles McCurdy labels decisions such as determining "how much
water each of several appropriators might take from a common stream" as "difficult". McCurdy, supra note 64, at 258. This view is mistaken, as McCurdy implicitly
acknowledges in the same paragraph-courts evolved rules of thumb, such as using
the capacity of a ditch as prima facie evidence of the extent of each appropriation.
Id. at 258-59. Courts might label factual issues in water cases, as in the opinions
McCurdy quotes, as "'exceedingly complicated and embarrassing"' but they also
acknowledged that "'[t]he Courts do not, however, refuse the consideration of subjects, because of the complicated and embarrassing character of the questions to
which they give rise.'" Id. at 259 (quoting Ortman v. Dixon, 13 Cal. 33, 39 (1859);
Butte Canal and Ditch Co. v. Vaughn, 11 Cal. 143, 152 (1858)).
78 See, e.g., Dick v. Caldwell, 14 Nev. 167, 170 (1879) (limiting claim to water
actually put to use and noting that even if claimant had diverted additional water
beyond what he used, "[t]urning water out of the stream for no useful purpose did
not give him any additional rights").
79 Krogh, supra note 16, at 16. Ms. Krogh is critical of this practice, arguing that it
meant there was "little or no independent review of their technical or legal sufficiency." Id. This assertion misses the point. There is no need for independent review of stipulations between parties, since a common law action determines only the
rights of the parties to the stipulations. Even if two individuals brought a collusive
lawsuit and made stipulations such that one was found to have appropriated the
entire water course in question, such a finding would not be good against others and
other claimants would have the opportunity to test the factual claims in proceedings
against them. The competitive nature of the litigation process thus ensures there is
no need for independent review of stipulations.
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Other disputes required simple choices among alternative
rules.8 1 Again, the problem was no different for a court than

choice among other competing rules adopted by other courts,
some of which adopted practical solutions. As the Montana Su-

preme Court noted, to resolve disputes sometimes required
courts to "arbitrarily fix a particular day or days for appropriations of water" situations.8 2
Early statutes governing appropriation systems eased proof issues further. Typically, such statutes provided for posting of notices of diversions, recording of claims at county recorders'
offices, and diligent efforts to put the water to beneficial use.8 3
Nonetheless, despite the important role of water law statutes,
courts recognized the common law nature of prior appropriation
law.84 For example, the California Supreme Court held that
someone who had appropriated water but not followed the statutory requirements for recording an appropriation had a claim:
"[T]here can be no doubt that since the Code, as before, he has a
perfect right, deducible from common-law principles, to the
water actually appropriated as against all the world except the
owner of the soil and those claiming adversely who have complied with the law." 85 Similarly, water law expert Wells Hutchins
86
located the priority principle in local custom.
80 See Records of In re North Crow Land and Cattle Company's Ditches (on file
with Wyoming State Archives, Laramie Clerk of Dist. Ct., Water Records, Box 1,
Folders: Dockets 3, 4, 6, 12, 18, 21, 26, 31, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44).
81 See, e.g., S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Dufour, 30 P. 783 (Cal. 1892) (holding water collected from percolating ground water not capable of being appropriated).
82 McDonald v. Lannen, 47 P. 648, 648 (Mont. 1897).
83 See Johnson & DuMars, supra note 22, at 351 (discussing 1872 California statute and similar statutes from Arizona, Colorado, Dakota Territory, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming); Moyer v. Preston, 44 P. 845, 849-50
(Wyo. 1896) (describing operation of Wyoming recording statutes, which provided
that no evidence would be accepted from someone who had failed to record a water
rights claim from 1886 to 1890); see also 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 175 (noting
that early statutes "were generally short" and many required that a notice be posted
"at the point of diversion" and also with the county).
84 See 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 176 ("What statutes in various States did was
to give legislative sanction to methods of appropriation already developed by
custom.").
85 De Necochea v. Curtis, 22 P. 198, 199 (Cal. 1889); see also Nielson v. Parker,
115 P. 488, 489-490 (Idaho 1911) (same).
86 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 168-69 (noting that California, Montana, Nevada,
and Idaho all recognized customary sources of priority but that Kansas courts rejected it prior to statutory authorization).
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The common law of prior appropriation thus presented relatively clear-cut factual issues to juries. Its differences from riparian common law largely clarified rather than complicated factual
issues.87 Seniority therefore was an important innovation:8" "A
sharp-edged rule, ranking the quality of rights' titles by their
dates of issue, it prevents disputes and reduces bargaining costs
drastically by saying the most senior user gets all his water before
the next gets any."8 9
The system of rules produced by the common law was thus an
effective institution built around private rights and markets. As
water rights experts economist Terry Anderson and attorney
Pamela Snyder conclude:
The belief that the doctrine of appropriation contains a great
deal of potential for market failure is pervasive but largely unfounded. Though the doctrine is not without transactions
costs, the allocation problems in many western states are not
so much the fault of prior appropriation as they are the fault
of restrictions
placed on appropriative water rights and
90
markets.

Indeed, the prior appropriation system is generally regarded as
"more flexible as regards transfers" and as providing "greater security than the riparian doctrine."9 1
As an institutional response, the development of common law
of prior appropriation economized a scarce resource in the less
populated West: decision makers' time and energy. 92 The introduction of the seniority principle meant that many disputes never
needed to reach a court, because in many instances individuals
could determine their relative rights by simply comparing priori87 This is not to discount the substantive differences between these two approaches. There were also important differences in legal rules. Riparian rights did
not allow one individual to claim an entire stream, while prior appropriation did.
LoNG, supra note 52, at sec. 17 at 33. Prior appropriation also introduced "three
features not found in the earlier common law system: precedence by seniority; the
requirement of beneficial use; and a locational arrangement which was conducive to
transferability." Scott & Coustalin, supra note 51, at 916.
88 But not too much of an innovation-Scott and Coustalin suggest that "the earliest miners and settlers could easily have gotten the idea of seniority as a criterion for
the better title from existing water law." Scott & Coustalin, supra note 51, at 914.
89 Id. at 919.
90 ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 17, at 105.

91 Ronald N. Johnson et al., The Definition of a Surface Water Right and Transferability, 24 J.L. & ECON. 273, 273 (1981).
92 See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Econ-

omies, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 10-11 (1994) (describing need to conserve legal
resources where scarce).
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ties. It also significantly limited the potential for bias by shifting
decisions to clearer issues (e.g., priority, beneficial use) from
muddier issues (e.g., reasonableness of use).93 Similarly, resolving only actual disputes meant that no decisions were needed on
the hypothetical disputes necessary to make a complete, consistent allocation of all rights to a particular body of water. For a
region often plagued by corrupt and unaccountable territorial
judges,94 this was an important feature.95 The common law of
prior appropriation also met another basic test-it was seen as
fair.

G.

96

The Evolution of the Common Law of Water in the West

The great divide in the substantive rules of American water
law, the change from riparian to mixed and prior appropriation
at the 100th meridian, has prompted a number of theories of the
origin of the western rules. Most "seem to present westerners
deliberately turning from an outdated eastern riparian water
right to find a system with better features. Although vivid,...
the portrayal reflects hindsight reasoning and ignores the nineteenth century reality." 97 Water law experts Scott and Coustalin
persuasively argue that this emphasis on differences in substance
overemphasizes the differences between the common law of riparian rights and the common law of prior appropriation:
[T]he common law of water was not outdated. It had been
keeping up with the times, changing very rapidly for at least
one hundred years, remarkably transforming itself from one
93 But see MILLER, supra note 49, at 7 (arguing that prior appropriations also
were sufficiently underdetermined in reasonableness concepts to allow "room for
the play of ideology and judicial choice"). Miller is mistaken because here she underestimates the importance of the role of the jury, although she acknowledges it
elsewhere in her book.
94 See infra note 104.
95 Even such judges were more independent than their legislative counterparts.
For example, in Catherine Miller's history of the Miller and Lux Cattle Company,
she recounts how the company viewed judges as preferable to juries but still as "unpredictable and unreliable.... [E]ven the best of judges, those holding 'sound' views
of the law, might rule in unexpected ways." MILLER, supra note 49, at 176.
96
See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 17, at 43 ("In part, it was a sense of
justice that led the early settlers to allocate water rights on the basis of 'first in time,
first in right.'").
97 Scott & Coustalin, supra note 51, at 909-10 (footnotes omitted); see also Rose,
supra note 63, at 265 ("Thus in the West, according to a number of authors, scarcity
and the need for careful husbanding of water resources drove water law beyond
riparianism's vague correlative rights, and into the more expensive but also more
effective appropriation regime of individual property rights in water.").
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ruling principle to another. But the actual, riparian law of
their day, with its frequent changes brought on by the revolution in milling, textile and metal industries, must have been
utterly unknown to the young pioneers who are now thought
of as the inventors of the prior-appropriation system. As
water users they were merely following a self-help experimental approach in organizing their respective rights and obligations in a new land as best they could.9 8
Arguing from a different perspective, University of Colorado
Professor Charles F. Wilkinson termed the early decisions developing the prior appropriation doctrine "common law judging at
its best. With no statutes to speak of, western courts looked
where they should have looked-to custom, to conditions in the
field, and to economic and social needs." 99
One can, therefore, see the development of prior appropriation as merely the common law's adaptation to the arid West"merely" because it was no different than the common law's ability to adapt more generally. Indeed, Carol Rose argues persuasively that the evolution of the common law of riparian water
rights in the eastern United States was itself an efficient evolution of rules in response to shifting demands on water resources.
The early common law rules centered on "ancient use" evolved
into a reasonable use doctrine in response to a change from "stable and relatively low demand for water resources ...

only spo-

radically threatened by extreme individual behaviors" to
industrial demands for water power.1
Focusing on the differences in substance between riparian and
prior appropriation thus misses the relationship between the two
systems as expressions of the common law. As Carol Rose notes,
citing Thomas Merrill's work, the riparian/prior appropriation
shift is consistent with a general pattern of common law rules
that are discretionary in high transaction costs situations like
those that existed in the East and with "all-or-nothing" 'mechanical' doctrines that dominate in low-transaction cost environments
like the West. 10 1
Scott & Coustalin, supra note 51, at 909-10 (footnotes omitted).
99 Wilkinson, supra note 70, at 6-7; see also REISNER, supra note 3, at 47 (arguing
that truly "revolutionary" approach would have been "trying to graft English common law and the principles and habits of wet-zone agriculture onto a desert
landscape").
100 Rose, supra note 63, at 266.
101 Id. at 285 (citing Thomas Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J.LEG. STUD. 13, 19 (1985)). All or nothing rules are
appropriate in a low transaction cost environment because the losing party can eas98
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As the brief summary above suggests, to a certain extent all
common law water law doctrines rested on relatively imprecise
rules. The imprecision, however, resided in different places in
the two substantive doctrines. The common law of riparian
rights was most vague in explicating the legal duties of the rights
holders, somewhat less vague in determining how to resolve conflicts in use, and least vague concerning who the rights holders
were (owners of riparian lands). The common law of prior appropriation, by contrast, had explicit and clear legal rules stating
who held rights and what those rights were (he who appropriates
owns the water) and how to resolve rights conflicts (first in time
wins). The appearance of a lack of clarity in the prior appropriation rules came from the facts of the cases. Resolution of such
cases required determining who had appropriated, when the appropriation had occurred, and how much had been appropriated.
Even in those areas, however, the factual questions presented
were generally more straightforward than those presented by riparian common law. These differences had important consequences for how the vague areas were clarified in particular
cases. In short, in riparian jurisdictions, judges had a larger role;
in prior appropriation jurisdictions, juries played a larger role.
The importance of this distinction should not be discounted.
Only two of the seventeen prior appropriation states adopted a
central planning approach before statehood, and both of those
did so in the twentieth century, well after many of the problems
of territorial status had been resolved. Relying on juries, rather
than judges, made an especially important difference in areas organized as territories. As Catherine Miller notes in her insightful
history of the Miller & Lux Cattle Company, powerful interests
found juries "a 'vexatious' problem because they followed popular notions of justice rather than the letter of the law."1 °2
The structure of territorial government allocated significant
power to officials not responsible to residents of the territory.
The executive and judicial branches, for example, were controlled by officials appointed by the federal government. Only
the legislatures were popularly elected. Federal control of the
judiciary was especially problematic. Although there were some
ily transact around any inefficient outcomes. In a high transaction cost environment,
however, it is more often too expensive to transact around inefficient rulings and so
giving a court more discretion is important.
102 MILLER, supra note 49, at 175; see also Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes & Cattlemen, supra note 64, at 667-69.
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excellent judges among those appointed to the territorial
benches, there were also many mediocre (and worse) individuals
who served. °3 Juries, by contrast, remained drawn from the local population.
In such an institutional setting, the common law of prior appropriation had significant advantages. Most disputes under the
rules were disputes about facts and so the province of local juries,
not federal appointees. Relying on adjudication meant that the
appointed executive branch had little or no role in resolving
water rights questions. Further, the content of legal rules was
governed by the common law of prior appropriation, common to
states and territories across the region and expressed by courts
across the West, and so the ability of individual territorial judges
to innovate was significantly limited. Importantly, California's
rapid and early production of water law precedent after statehood meant that there was a clear benchmark against which to
compare territorial judges' decisions. In addition, the legislature,
the only branch controlled entirely locally, could attempt to
amend any problematic rulings through statutes.
Relying on the common law also conserved scarce legislative
resources. At a time when territorial legislatures were struggling
to create a legal framework for their fledgling societies-creating
probate codes, establishing political structures, and the like-using the common law for water meant one less area that needed
immediate attention. It also allowed markets to determine water
uses. 104

We need not attribute any grand design to the creation of the
prior appropriation system. No plan was needed, however, because settlers in the West had incentives to get the institutions
right. As noted water rights authorities Terry Anderson and
Pamela Snyder note:
The western frontier was an experiment with the evolution of
property rights. Because the actors in that experiment had to
bear the consequences of their actions, they had an incentive
to develop institutions that got the incentives [for resource
103 See Kermit L. Hall, Hacks and Derelicts Revisited: American TerritorialJudiciary, 1789-1959, 11 WEST. HIST. Q. 273 (1981); JOHN D.W. GUICE, THE ROCKY
MOUNTAIN

BENCH:

THE TERRITORIAL SUPREME COURTS OF COLORADO, MON-

TANA, AND WYOMING,

1861-1890 (1972).

104 Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Markets and the Problem of Shifting Para-

digms, in WATER MARKETING, supra note 65, at 1, 2 ("For a brief period in the midnineteenth century, water policy embraced markets.").
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use] right. Because water was a limiting factor in agriculture
and mining, it was critical to provide incentives for private
owners to invest in delivering water to where it was most proappropriation doctrine effectively got the
ductive. The prior
10 5
incentives right.

II
THE COMMON LAW IN THE COURTS

The method of analyzing the functioning of the various water
law systems used here is to examine the opinions from court
cases dealing with water rights disputes. Opinions are, of course,
imperfect measures as they record only the decisions in disputes
that reached the court of last resort, neglecting those settled or
ended after district court proceedings without an appeal and
those that never reached a court. Nineteenth-century records being somewhat sparse, however, they are the best we can do in
many instances. In this section, I examine the common law of
prior appropriation as set out by opinions in disputes in courts in
two jurisdictions: Montana and Wyoming. 1°6
One important feature is immediately obvious: the courts did
not deal extensively with water law issues before the creation of
supra note 17, at 44.
106 Water law cases were identified by examining the volumes of Montana Reports
105 ANDERSON & SNYDER,

and Wyoming Reports from volume 1 through the last cases reported for 1899. The
reporters include digests by subject matter at the end. I examined each case listed
under a heading relating to water (water rights, irrigation, etc.) and cases given
cross-references in those sections. It is, of course, possible that other cases involving
water law exist that were not catalogued as such by the reporters. It is unlikely that
any significant water law cases were missed by the reporters, however. The reports
were produced by for-profit enterprises who were competing for the official contracts for the job and, starting in 1884, with West Publishing Company's Pacific Reporter, which included both states.
I chose Wyoming and Montana for this case study for several reasons. First, Wyoming was the obvious choice given that I was examining the spread of the Wyoming
system. Second, I was familiar with conditions in Montana from earlier work on
Montana legal history. See Andrew P. Morriss, "This State Will Soon Have Plenty of
Laws "-Lessonsfrom One Hundred Years of Codification in Montana, 56 MONT. L.
REV. 359 (1995) [hereinafter Lessons]; Andrew P. Morriss, Private Actors & Structural Balance: Militia and the Free Rider Problem in Private Provision of Law, 58
MONT. L. REV. 115 (1997); Andrew P. Morriss, Decius S. Wade's The Common Law,
59 MONT. L. REV. 225 (1998); Morriss, Legal Argument, supra note 39; Morriss,
Miners, Vigilantes & Cattlemen, supra note 64; Andrew P. Morriss et al., Debating
the Field Civil Code 105 Years Late, 61 MONTANA L. REV. 371 (2000). Finally, a
survey of water law cases from across the west convinced me that Montana was
reasonably typical of the Rocky Mountain and Plains states during this time in its
approach to water law.
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water codes. This is true of other western states (except California) as well. Scott and Coustalin's survey of water law found
that, because of sparse and dispersed populations, "litigation was
comparatively rare, and judges were not often called on to make
crucial decisions about water law and individual water rights. Instead, the water rights were first demanded from... 'customary'
procedures." 10 7 Although Scott and Coustalin attribute this
largely to the formative period of western states' legal development, particularly the rushed development of rights to satisfy
"transient gold miners and impatient settlers,"10 8 at least in Montana and Wyoming this continued to be true for decades. Nonetheless, the courts did deal with water law issues in the context of
the common law and they provide the source material for this
Article.
A.

Water Law in the Montana Courts

Montana was created in 1864 out of Idaho Territory."0 9 It remained a territory for much longer than many other parts of the
West, in part because its population was initially heavily Democratic at a time of Republican dominance of the national government. 10 Finally attaining statehood in 1889, Montana spent her
first years of statehood largely locked in partisan gridlock.1 1 '
Nineteenth-century Montana thus represents a good laboratory
for examining the comparatively undisturbed development of the
common law.
Founded by placer miners' 12 in the gold rushes of the mid1860s, Montana Territory eventually came to be dominated by
three major industries. Mining, which quickly became a capitalintensive hard rock industry, dominated south-central Montana,
centering on Butte. The battles between rival copper mining
107 Scott & Coustalin, supra note 51, at 901. Further work is needed to examine
the customary law of water rights in the nineteenth century West.
108 Id.
109 See

JAMES MCCLELLAN HAMILTON, FROM WILDERNESS TO STATEHOOD:

A

1805-1900, at 276-77 (1957).
110 Id. at 524-36 (describing efforts to gain statehood and role of politics in delaying Montana). On the relationship between western states' admission to the Union
and their Republican voting records, see David W. Brady & Roger G. Noll, Public
Policy and the Admission of the Western States, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
AMERICAN WEST (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1994).
I11 See Morriss, Lessons, supra note 106, at 381-86.
112 Placer miners are those who recover minerals through surface techniques such
as panning and sluicing.
HISTORY OF MONTANA
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companies played an important role in shaping Montana politics,
as did the struggle between capital and labor in the mining industry.1 13 In eastern Montana, a free range cattle industry dominated, much like the cattle industries ofcwestern Dakota
Territory and Wyoming. As in those states, Montana cattlemen
struggled to establish property rights in the face of government
homestead and land policies that thwarted them repeatedly. As
pioneer rancher Granville Stuart put it: "The bulk of [the] range
was unsurveyed and no title could be obtained."1'1 4 Finally, in
central and western Montana, cattle ranching and other forms of
agriculture took root, making use of natural barriers to resolve
some of the property rights issues that plagued the eastern parts
of the territory and using irrigation to improve productivity.
None of these groups was able to dominate completely the
Montana territorial or early state governments, which were correspondingly marked by vigorous political competition. All
three groups had distinct interests with respect to water: cattlemen needed water on the range for their herds, irrigators needed
water for their crops, and mining companies needed to transport
vast amounts of water to the mines for power generation and ore
processing.
The Montana Territorial Legislature passed several statutes
dealing with water issues and in the first decade of statehood the
state legislature passed several more. 1 5 These statutes largely
dealt with the method of perfecting an appropriation and similar
issues." 6 Looking at the entire set of statutes in 1921, the Montana Supreme Court found that the statutes expressed a policy
adopting a purely appropriative system, rather than the California mixed system of both appropriation and riparian rights, but
also noted that this issue was a case of first impression at a relatively late date in the state's legal history." 7 In part this reflects
a strong consensus among Montanans that there were no riparian
rights. As the court noted,
113

See

MICHAEL P. MALONE, THE BATTLE FOR BuTrrE: MINING

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER, 1864-1906 (1981).
114 ROBERT H. FLETCHER, FREE GRASS TO FENCES:

&

POLITICS ON

THE MONTANA

CATTLE

47 (1960).
115 The history of Montana water legislation is summarized in Mettler v. Ames
Realty Co., 201 P. 702, 706-08 (Mont. 1921).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 707-08. The court noted that two earlier opinions had expressed in dicta
that the initial statute establishing appropriative rights had precluded the California
system. Id. at 707.
RANGE STORY
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since the organization of Montana territory-a period of more
than 50 years-no owner, claimant, or occupant of riparian
lands has ever asserted in the courts the common-law doctrine
of riparian rights, as applied to the use of water, until the present action
118 was instituted, so far as our investigation
discloses.
The role of statutes in determining Montana water law development through 1900 was relatively slight. Although in retrospect the nineteenth-century statutory scheme as a whole was
held to constitute a rejection of a mixed riparian-appropriation
system, there was no clear declaration of policy from the various
statutory provisions. The statutes did little more than provide
some of the details of Montana water law. There was thus ample
space for the common law to fill.
1.

The TerritorialCourt

The territorial supreme court issued fifteen opinions in water
law cases during its twenty-four year history (1865-1889).119 Of
these, five dealt with purely procedural matters in the context of
water law cases and one dealt solely with construction of a federal statute on rights of way for water ditches. 2 ° Thus, only ten
opinions dealt with substantive issues of water law, suggesting
that water law issues were not frequently before the court. It is
worthwhile to examine these opinions in some detail.
The territorial supreme court's water law opinions suggest several things about how water law was perceived in Montana.
First, the territorial court paid a great deal of attention to precedent, and to California precedent in particular. 12 It was not simply California precedent, however, that governed. The opinions
also make explicit reference to customary legal institutions, such
as mining districts, to determine the relevant rules.' 22 The terri118 Id.at 705.
119 Because the court's opinions from before 1868 were not officially reported,

this may slightly understate the number of cases.
120 See Caruthers v. Pemberton, 1 Mont. 111 (1869) (procedural issue); Harris v.
Shontz, 1 Mont. 212 (1870) (procedural issue); Noteware v. Sterns, 1 Mont. 311
(1871) (right of way statute); Toombs v. Hornbuckle, 3 Mont. 193 (1878) (procedural
issue); Bass v. Buker, 12 P. 922 (Mont. 1887) (procedural issue); Welch v. Keene, 21
P. 25 (Mont. 1889) (procedural issue).
121 See, e.g., Alder Gulch Consol. Mining Co. v. Hayes, 9 P. 581, 585 (Mont. 1886)

(citing seven California opinions, among ten opinions all together, as "authorities to
maintain these propositions").
122 See, e.g., id. at 583 (discussing mining district rules): Hill v. Lenormand, 16 P.
266, 268 (Ariz. 1888) (declaring that the law was settled by courts and Congress and
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torial court also rarely framed a question as a case of first impression for the territory, instead seeking to resolve issues through
the proper interpretation of existing precedents from outside
Montana. 123 Water law, then, was seen as a body of law existing
in Montana independently of the declarations of the territorial
courts.
Cases decided by the territorial supreme court also suggest
that the Montana courts had little difficulty resolving the factual
disputes necessary to decide the cases. The Montana territorial
courts appear not to have had problems deciding, for example,
124
who was the prior appropriator.
Most of the legal rules declared by the Montana Territorial Supreme Court derived from simple and straightforward applica125
tion of principles from the existing framework of water law.
Only four of the ten substantive opinions show any sign that the
court believed the legal issue to be difficult. 126 Examining the
more difficult cases closely sheds additional light on the common
law of water rights.
The first of the legally challenging issues arose in the first sub1 27
stantive water law opinion published by the territorial court.
The court faced the difficult problem of choosing Montana's
water law system as well as evaluating a territorial statute purporting to allow apportionment of water between users in times
of shortage without regard to prior appropriation. Two ranches
used water from Prickly Pear Creek for irrigation, with the downstream ranch claiming three hundred inches of water based on
"by the long-established customs of the country"); Drake v. Earhart, 23 P. 541, 542
(Idaho 1890) (noting that prior appropriation was the law through custom, approval
of legislatures and courts).
123 See, e.g., Fabian v. Collins, 3 Mont. 215, 223-24 (1878) (framing issue as one of
interpreting California opinion rather than as case of first impression).
124 See, e.g., Columbia Mining Co. v. Holter, 1 Mont. 296, 299-300 (1871).
125 Id. at 300 (holding that the intent to appropriate must be acted upon "with all
reasonable diligence"); Woolman v. Garringer, I Mont. 535 (1872) (granting that
appropriator can change place of water use); Atchison v. Peterson, 1 Mont. 561
(1872) (maintaining that minor amounts of sediment in water after discharge by upstream appropriator are insufficient to justify injunctive relief); Barkley v. Tieleke, 2
Mont. 59 (1874) (holding that transfer of water rights was effective despite failure to
comply with all required formalities); Tucker v. Jones, 8 Mont. 225 (1888) (noting
that the sale of land that requires water will be assumed to include water rights
unless specifically reserved).
12 6
Thorp v. Woolman, I Mont. 168 (1870); Fabian v. Collins, 3 Mont. 215 (1878):
Alder Gulch, 9 P. at 581; Ford v. Gregson, 7 Mont. 89 (1887).
127 Thorp, 1 Mont. at 168.
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prior appropriation. During a drought in 1869, the upstream
rancher took advantage of an 1865 law allowing county commissioners to appoint a three-member commission to apportion
water rights. The commission granted each ranch half the water
in the creek. The downstream rancher then sought relief in the
courts. In an opinion notable for its failure to cite any legal authority, the court struck the statute as a violation of separation of
powers, holding the determination of the legal rights of the parties to be a judicial function.1 28 Ducking the issue of "whether or
not the doctrine of appropriation applies to ranchmen as well as
to miners," the court considered whether the commission's allorights of the downstream rancher and
cation violated the riparian
29
concluded that it did.'
The legal challenges presented by this first substantive water
law opinion were considerable. Not only did the court confront
the legitimacy of a territorial statute, but it was required to consider the difficult relationship between riparian and prior appropriation law at an early stage in Montana's legal development.
The 1865 legislature was itself controversial 130 (and its enactments were later voided by Congress), and the legitimacy of that
legislature was an ongoing issue in the Montana courts and legal
community. It is no surprise, therefore, that the relatively young
territorial court struggled with the issues.
Not until 1878 did the territorial court again appear to have
difficulty with a legal issue concerning water rights. In Fabian v.
Collins13 1 the court confronted a claim that muddied a contract
claim with a prior appropriation issue. A group of miners had
appropriated water out of Silver Creek. When newcomers
named Loyd, Moss, and Riley needed water, however, the original appropriators agreed to share the water, allowing Loyd and
his friends to use the water when the original appropriators did
not need it. Sometime later, Loyd and his friends sold their mining claim and water ditch. The deeds which Loyd, Moss, and
Riley used to convey the property appeared to convey water
rights, which the three men did not have because the rights were
held by the original appropriators. Significantly, at the time of
the sale and delivery of the deeds, the original appropriators
128 Id. at 170-71.
129 Id. at 171-72.

See Morriss, Lessons, supra note 106, at 379-80.
131 3 Mont. 215 (1878).
130
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were present. Indeed, one of the original appropriators drafted
the deeds and another signed the deeds as a witness. The court
held that the original appropriators' silence estopped them from
asserting their rights as original appropriators against the
purchasers.
The [buyers] could gain no knowledge of the state of the [sellers'] title by an examination of the records of the mining district
and county in which the property is situated, which is often the
convenient means of ascertaining a fact of this kind. The [buyers] acquired by their purchase the possession of the water,
which had been used by [the sellers] more than five years without
interruption, and could presume reasonably that this use had
been rightful.1 32
The court thus took into account the informality of the water
rights system and used it to estop the original appropriators.
Seven years later, the territorial supreme court again confronted a significant issue of substantive water law. Noting that it
"would be warranted in refusing to determine this cause, for the
reason that it does not comply with the rule of this court as to the
mechanical method of its presentation," the court nonetheless
reached the merits "on account of its importance. ' 13 3 The issue
was whether an upstream appropriator had an obligation to return the water he used to the stream from which it was taken to
avoid harm to the downstream appropriators. The court held
[w]e think it to be the law that in a mining gulch, when water
appropriated by a ditch for the purpose of being used upon a
mining claim has served its purpose upon such claim, it must
be discharged therefrom for use by the owners of claims below
for use upon their claims. The mining claimant below is entitled to the water of the stream flowing down the gulch, subject
to the prior appropriation of the water by the owners of claims
above him for use upon such claims, and subject only to the
reasonable diminution and deterioration by its necessary use
upon such upper claims. This is reasonable.13 The
water flow4
ing by each claim naturally belongs thereto.
The following year, the territorial court issued another substantive opinion on water law. In Ford v. Gregson135 the court
was presented with a contract between a group of water rights
132 Id. at 230.
133 Alder Gulch Consol. Mining Co. v. Hayes, 9 P. 581, 581 (Mont. 1886).
134

Id. at 584.

13514 P. 659 (Mont. 1887).
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owners. The contract provided that none of the group would sell
his rights or compromise any dispute over the water rights without the written consent of the others. Further, the contract provided that all would make common cause in any litigation over
the water rights. Finally, the contract provided for $10,000 in liquidated damages for its breach. All but one member of the
group agreed to settle a water rights dispute with some neighbors
by selling their mineral claims and water rights. The holdout
sued for the liquidated damages.
The court found the contract void as against public policy because it prohibited the sale of the water rights, analogizing it to
contracts in restraint of trade. And, the court added, this was
"especially" against public policy "in a country like this, in which
water is necessary for so many industrial pursuits." 136 The court
also struck the contract as void on the ground that it "imposes a
restraint and condition upon compromises or settlements of litigation and disputes which are favored by law."13' 7 Ironically the
modern, administrative versions of prior appropriation largely
forbid the right of transfer that the court found so important.
Only one opinion reads (today at least) as if political considerations dominated. 138 In its 1889 opinion in McCauley v. McKeig,13 9 the territorial court affirmed a judgment against a ditch
owner seeking an injunction and damages from an upstream mining concern, whose activities diverted water from his ditch and
degraded the quality of the water remaining. The nuisance claim
for diverting water was quickly resolved by resort to the prior
appropriation rule and a finding that the defendant had priority.1 40 More importantly, however, the court rejected the downstream user's nuisance claim concerning the debris. While the
court cautioned that it should not be understood "as declaring
that the owner of a placer mine may disregard the rights of
others owning property adjacent to his," it nonetheless held that
"the public policy of this Territory demands that a trifling-a
nominal-damage shall not be ground sufficient to destroy one
14 1
of its leading industries.
136

Id. at 662.

137
138

Id.

By "political" I mean without considerations of public policy but determined
by special interest considerations.
139 21 P. 22 (Mont. 1889).
140 Id. at 23.
141 ld
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What can we conclude from the record of the Montana Territorial Supreme Court in water law? First, the number of water
law disputes to reach the courts was relatively small. 4 2 Second,
the number of issues the court thought required its attention was
even smaller. As the court demonstrated in Alder Gulch, it
could easily overlook procedural or "mechanical" flaws in cases
to determine an outcome when it wanted to do so to reach a
substantive issue. That it rarely did so testifies not only to the
degree of restraint shown by the judges but also by the perceived
lack of urgency to address substantive water law issues. California precedent provided the guideposts for most decisions, and,
possibly, the parties were able to look those up and determine
the outcomes of disputes without resort to the territorial courts.
Third, the court took an extremely practical approach to resolving the few substantive issues it considered.
2.

The State Court

Statehood brought an increase in the number of water law
cases before the Montana Supreme Court, with an average of
three per year during the first decade of statehood compared to
an average of less than one per year in the territorial period.14 3
As before, cases involving procedural issues, 144 evidentiary questions, 14 5 or other non-substantive issues 146 dominated, however,
and the new state supreme court decided few substantive water
law issues. Two cases also dealt with issues concerning interpretation of non-water law provisions of the 1895 Civil Code and
142 Compare California, where Chief Justice Lucien Shaw concluded in 1922 that
the California court reports "contain more decisions on [water law] than on any
other." Shaw, supra note 64, at 444.
143 This cannot fairly be attributed entirely to a growing population: the average
in the ten years before statehood was still less than one case per year and even in the
four years just before statehood, the busiest time for the court in the territorial period, the average was still less than two cases per year.
144 Johnson v. Bielenberg, 37 P. 12 (Mont. 1894); Beatty v. Murray Placer Mining
Co., 39 P. 82 (Mont. 1895); Miles v. Du Bey, 39 P. 313 (Mont. 1895); Emerson v.
Eldorado Ditch Co., 44 P. 969 (Mont. 1896); Crowder v. McDonnell, 54 P. 43 (Mont.
1898).
145 Carron v. Wood, 26 P. 388 (Mont. 1891); Sweetland v. Olsen, 27 P. 339 (Mont.
1891); Leonard v. Shatzer, 28 P. 457 (Mont. 1891); Floyd v. Boulder Flume & Mercantile Co., 28 P. 450 (Mont. 1892); Kleinschmidt v. Greiser, 37 P. 5 (Mont. 1894);
Kimpton v. Jubilee Placer Mining Co., 16 Mont. 379 (1895): Smith v. Hope Mining
Co. of St. Louis, 45 P. 632 (Mont. 1896); Gassert v. Noyes, 44 P. 959 (Mont. 1896);
Arnold v. Passavant, 49 P. 400 (Mont. 1897); Wood v. Lowney, 50 P. 794 (Mont.
1897); Haggin v. Saile, 59 P. 154 (Mont. 1899).
146 Power v. Switzer, 55 P. 32 (Mont. 1898).
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their interaction with water law. 14 7
A few decisions in the first ten years of the new state supreme
48
court did, however, address substantive issues of water law.'
The first four of these came shortly after statehood, with the new
court asserting itself over its territorial predecessor. In the first
case, involving a dispute among forty-one claimants to water in
"Race Track Creek," the court held for two members of a group
of twenty-four miners, who had previously jointly appropriated
water for mining and so held the water as tenants in common.
Others among the forty-one parties argued that when the miners'
group ceased to use its ditch for mining purposes, the water was
subject to appropriation by others. The court, however, held that
the two former miners were entitled to relate their appropriation
for irrigation back to the original mining appropriation and so
take priority over all but their cotenants. The change of the
water's use from mining to irrigation did not constitute abandon149
ment by the twenty-four cotenants.
That one tenant in common may preserve the entire estate or
right held in common is a proposition so well settled it is unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof. In this the tenant in
common is only preserving his own, as his right partakes of the
whole. It would seem to follow from this analogy that one tenant
in common may, of course, preserve part of the common estate
or right. In the peculiar case of water rights it would appear to
be so with more force, because the right can only be preserved by
both the use, and the necessity for the use, for some beneficial
purpose; so that a tenant in common, in preserving this right, can
150
only preserve it to such extent as he can use it.
The case of Fitzpatrick v. Montgomery15 1 gives a representative example of how the Montana courts handled new substan147 Crawford v. Minnesota & Montana Land & Improvement Co., 38 P. 713
(Mont. 1894); Middle Creek Ditch Co. v. Henry, 39 P. 1054 (Mont. 1895).

148 Meagher v. Hardenbrook, 28 P. 451 (Mont. 1891); Quigley v. Birdseye, 28 P.
741 (Mont. 1892); Raymond v. Wimsette, 31 P. 537 (Mont. 1892); Salazar v. Smart,
30 P. 676 (Mont. 1892); Creek v. Bozeman Water Works Co., 38 P. 459 (Mont. 1894);
Sloan v. Glancy, 47 P. 334 (Mont. 1897); McDonald v. Lannen, 47 P. 648 (Mont.
1897); Arnold, 49 P. at 400; Fitzpatrick v. Montgomery, 50 P. 416 (Mont. 1897);

Murray v. Tingley, 50 P. 723 (Mont. 1897); Wood, 50 P. at 794: Crowder v. McDonnell, 54 P. 43 (Mont. 1898); Power, 55 P. at 32; Glass v. Basin Mining & Concentrating Co., 55 P. 1047 (Mont. 1899); Smith v. Denniff, 57 P. 557 (Mont. 1899): Haggin,

59 P. at 154.
149 Meagher, 28 P. at 452-53.
150 id.
151 50 P. 416 (Mont. 1897).
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tive problems. Montgomery, a placer miner in Deer Lodge
County, worked a claim on lands above Fitzpatrick's ranch.
Montgomery's mining activities included using the waters of Buffalo Creek to process his ore and disposing of tailings (mine refuse) by dumping them into the creek. These tailings then
washed down onto Fitzpatrick's ranch,
covering a large quantity thereof with such tailings, rocks and
debris, and destroying the same, and making it unfit for agriculture or any other useful purpose, and causing said Buffalo
creek, which runs through the land of plaintiff, to form a new
and different channel upon such land, whereby it is claimed
plaintiff's land was damaged in the sum of $750.152
This issue had been hard fought in California some years earlier, producing both court cases and legislation to deal with the
problem. 153 The Montana court thus had a significant amount of
precedent available to it. The opinion resolved the problem
based on three findings. First, individuals may appropriate water
for mining purposes. Second, mining purposes include the right
to deposit tailings in a running stream. Finally, the deposit of
tailings is subject to reasonable limits: "[T]his rule has never
been carried to the extent of permitting the miner to flood his
neighbor's land, and, by depositing [his] tailings and debris
thereon, to substantially injure or ruin his neighbor's
property.

154

In determining each of these points, the court reviewed precedent from other states in the West. After doing so, the court
summed up its approach to such questions:
We think, however, as is held by the authorities, that each case
of this character should be determined by its own facts and
circumstances. Persons appropriating water cannot avoid
fouling and obstructing, and, to some extent, diminishing, the
quantity of water in a stream. These things are unavoidable,
and are permitted to a reasonable extent in the right use of the
water. Verdicts and judgments for fanciful or insignificant
damages in such cases ought not to be rendered. Courts are
very cautious, and ought to be so, in issuing injunctions in such
cases, as more damage may be done by the injunction than
152 Id. at 416.
153 See ROBERT L.

KELLEY, GOLD VERSUS GRAIN:

THE HYDRAULIC MINING

(1959). For a discussion of
the choice between legislation and lawsuits in that controversy, see Jason Scott JohnCONTROVERSY IN CALIFORNIA'S SACRAMENTO VALLEY

ston, On the Commons and the Common Law, in
ENVIRONMENT 211 (Roger E.
154 Fitzpatrick, 50 P. at 417.

THE COMMON LAW AND THE

Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000).
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could be prevented by its issuance. It is a field of litigation
filled with great annoyance and difficulty to both legislatures
and courts. It will
continue to be such as long as the interests
1 55
of men conflict.
Here we see the reasoning of the common law in full flower:
the facts of the cases were of fundamental importance; rights

were to be protected but courts were to be cautious in using their
powers to alter private behavior.
In another important part of the decision, the Montana Supreme Court addressed the impact of the legislature's earlier
adoption of a recording scheme. Did the provision of a means of
recording water rights claims mean that the earlier method of
simply appropriating water was no longer available? Following
an earlier California case, the court found it did not. Before the

recording statute, the court noted,
Questions of priority, however, as well as of the original capacity, etc., of ditches depended chiefly on oral testimony,on the memory of eyewitnesses, often at fault through lapse of
time. Confusion and insecurity to vested rights resulted. To
obviate this as much as possible, the [recording] statute was
enacted. It required a notice of location to be posted at the
point of diversion, to apprise others who contemplated the acquisition of water rights from the same stream that the locator
had taken his initial step to appropriate water. It required a
recorded notice of appropriation, in order that a record might
be supplied, giving the history in detail of each appropriation,
which would inure to the benefit of their successors in interest,
as well as to the appropriator's, and not leave them dependent
upon the mere memory of witnesses when conflicts should
arise. In enacting this law the legislature did not contemplate
that one who failed to comply with the terms of the statute,
but who, in the absence of any conflicting adverse right, had
nevertheless actually diverted water and put it to a beneficial
use, should acquire no title thereby. The essence of an appropriation-a completed ditch, actually diverting water, and putting it to a beneficial use-remained the same as it had been
before. The object of the statute was to preserve evidence of
rights, and also to regulate the doctrine of relation back. It
follows that the statute controls this doctrine of relation back,
and that one who seeks to avail himself of it since the passage
of this act can only do so by a compliance with the statutory
requirements. 6
Here the court demonstrates the role of the legislature in mod155

Id. at 190.

156 Murray v. Tingley, 50 P. 723. 725 (Mont. 1897).
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ifying the common law. Water rights preceded legislation, which
existed only to ease questions of proof by creating an optional
objective means of proving claims. The court's rejection of the
notion that the statute implicitly replaced the common law means
of acquiring rights, rather than supplementing it, is notable for its
firmness and terseness, suggesting that it saw no reason to elaborate on the issue.
Finally, consider the one case in which the state supreme court
overruled a prior territorial court opinion on the same subject in
water law.157 In McDonald v. Lannen, an 1897 opinion, the
court reexamined Barkley v. Tieleke,'158 an 1874 territorial supreme court opinion that had "frequently been cited in the textbooks as a precedent 1 1 59 on the issue of the effect of an invalid
attempt to transfer a water right. Barkley concerned a mining
water rights claim and McDonald raised the issue in an agricultural context. Conceding that Barkley, "under the conditions of
facts involved therein, was a most just decision," the court none16
theless overturned it as applied in the agricultural context. 1
Barkley had held that a failed attempt to transfer a water right
meant that the attempted purchaser acquired rights only as an
appropriator on his own; he received no priority as a result of the
ineffective attempt at a sale. McDonald rejected this approach
because it conflicted with the approach to property in land. An
appropriator of land out of the public domain received rights
good against all but the government and has a claim that "is always carefully protected by the courts.' 16 1 Such land claims were
solid enough to permit the claimant to appropriate water for agricultural purposes.162 They could also be sold. 163 Following
Barkley with respect to agricultural water rights would mean,
however, that the property owner would sell his land but not his
water where a mistake was made in the transfer. Since the water
was likely to be crucial to making use of the land, this would be
"an inequitable doctrine" and "wholly unreasonable.' ' 1 64 Note
that Barkley remained good law with respect to mining water
157 McDonald v. Lannen, 47 P. 648 (Mont. 1897).
158 2 Mont. 59 (1874).
159 McDonald, 47 P. at 649.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 650.
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rights claims: "Different rules apply to the acquisition of title to
mining claims from those applicable to agricultural."' 6 5
Again we see the power and flexibility of the common law approach. A rule that worked well in the mining context 166 was
adapted to the facts of agricultural land. The rule is developed
incrementally, allowing the relevant distinction to emerge from
disputes. The purpose of the distinction is also notable: facilitating private transactions rather than implementing legislative
policy.
B.

Water Law in the Wyoming Courts

Before the legislature created a statutory procedure for appropriating water, people claimed water in Wyoming as elsewhere in
the early western settlements: they simply diverted the water
and applied it to a beneficial use. 1 67 "The simple formality of
posting a notice at the point of diversion, while not required, was
probably used in many instances." 168
The Wyoming Territorial Supreme Court did not decide any
significant water rights cases. 169 Although this may appear surprising in light of Montana's record, Wyoming's history offers a
plausible explanation. Unlike most of the rest of the West, Wyoming had no significant mining industry and hence fewer opportunities for use of water rights early in its history. It also had
relatively few residents and little privately held land in the territorial period. Free range cattle on public land and railroads,
passing through, dominated land use during the territorial period. As statehood neared, however, increasing conflict between
homesteaders and cattlemen developed.
Wyoming had a monolithic political culture built around a single fault line: cattlemen vs. farmers/homesteaders. In Montana,
by contrast, there were at least three such fault lines: cattlemen
vs. farmers; mining interests vs. cattlemen; and mining interests
vs. farmers. In addition, Montana's interest groups had internal
fault lines: mining was split between rival companies and between labor and capital, for example.
ld..
166 See Barkley v. Tieleke, 2 Mont. 59 (1874).
167 3 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 618.
165

168

Id.

169 There are no such cases indexed under water law topics in volumes 1-3 of
Wyoming Reports.
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As discussed below, this conflict affected the development of
the Wyoming system of central planning for water rights. Prior
to statehood, the Territorial Legislature passed only three acts
relating to water rights: an 1869 statute requiring notices of mining water claims, filing of such claims with counties, and a schedule for ditch construction; an 1886 statute requiring recording of
appropriations and commencement within sixty days of recording; and an 1888 modification of the 1886 statute.17 ° After statehood, the new Wyoming Supreme Court also addressed
relatively few substantive water law issues, not surprisingly as the
new Board of Control took jurisdiction of then-pending and new
water cases.' 7 1
Despite the new administrative structure, or perhaps because
of it, substantive questions remained. Indeed, the new structure
introduced additional potential for confusion about the nature of
water rights claims, moving the state supreme court to open one
opinion by cataloging the potential bases for the action, before
noting that it need not decide which one applied.17 2
One impact of the new administrative structure was to stretch
out contested proceedings. Johnson v. Little Horse Creek Irrigating Co., a case pending at statehood, was transferred to the
Board of Control in November 1890, which decided the case in
May, 1891. The appeal to the district court was dismissed in
March 1892, and the supreme court decision was issued in May
1893.173 The lengthy proceedings are all the more remarkable
because the case involved only rudimentary procedural questions. Perhaps because parties were testing the courts' attitude
toward the new system, some apparently frivolous appeals were
made.17 4
170 3 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 618-19.
171 See, e.g., Johnson v. Little Horse Creek Irrigating Co., 33 P. 22 (Wyo. 1893)
(noting that the case, pending at statehood, had been transferred to the Board of
Control).
172 Moyer v. Preston, 44 P. 845 (Wyo. 1896)
Whether this action was one brought under the then existing statutory provisions or an adjudication of the priorities of rights to use water for beneficial purposes, or was purely a personal action, brought by defendant in
error to restrain plaintiff in error from unlawfully diverting the waters of a
natural stream, to the detriment of defendant in error, and for damages for
a past diversion of such water, and incidentally a determination of the priorities between such parties, need not be determined.

Id. at 845.
173 Johnson, 33 P. at 22.
174 See, e.g., McPhail v. Forney, 35 P. 773, 773 (Wyo. 1894). In this case, the plain-
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Despite the administrative structure, the Wyoming Supreme
Court was occasionally called upon to apply the common law to
water issues, as in Frank v. Hicks .175 Frank, a complicated case
involving a mortgage, judgment creditors, bonds, and worse, addressed the issue of whether or not a deed of trust, or more generally any conveyance of land, for a parcel of land that did not
mention water rights implicitly included the water rights with the
land. 1 76 The court drew on several sources to resolve the issue.
First, it looked to "what we know as men of the general condition
of the country.' 7 7 Arid land required water to have value:
"[l]and and water together are of great value. The value of the
land without the use of the water is trivial."' 7 8 Second, the court
considered a range of precedents dealing with appurtenances to
179
land, from treatises and both western and non-western courts.
Finally, the court considered how the various common law rules
on appurtenances fit within the prior appropriation system.
Thus, for example, the court found that because of the requirement of beneficial use, water rights were distinct from easements
in gross.180 Reasoning from these sources, the court concluded
that the deed covered both land and water rights despite not explicitly mentioning the water rights.' 8 1 The court concluded by
noting that "[t]he case at bar seemed at first blush to be not free
from difficulty" but that "the apparent difficulties vanish on being approached" and "[t]he authorities admit of no other conclusion" than the one reached.1 82 A difficult case was thus resolved
through common law reasoning.
C. Summary
The common law of prior appropriation had significant
strengths. A flexible, fact-sensitive set of principles grew out of
tiff claimed more than one-fifth the water in a ditch, despite owning only one-fifth of
the water rights, because he owned more than one-fifth the land irrigated. The court
declared that the claim "might well be decided against him on the pleadings as well
as on the evidence." Id. at 774; see also Daley v. Anderson, 48 P. 839, 840 (Wyo.
1897) (using "ingenious" reasoning to question timeliness of filing).
175 35 P. 475 (Wyo. 1894).
176 Id. at 478.
177 Id. at 481.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 481-84.
180 Id. at 484.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 485.
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the experience of the West with water disputes. Water law rested

on clear principles, economized judicial resources by focusing on
factual inquiries, and facilitated private action by individuals.
Water law was not prescriptive but rather established the means
of creating property rights by individuals and resolved disputes
over the substance of those rights by resort to readily proved cri-

teria (e.g., seniority). Courts were aided by legislatures' creation
of transaction costs-reducing procedural innovations like registry
of rights.
The common law also had some weaknesses, particularly in its
early years. Proof issues often turned on fallible memories of
ditch capacities for water and the like. In addition, appellate

judges had difficulty understanding the record, which often
turned on detailed local knowledge shared by the trial court participants but missing from the appellate record. 8 3 Finally, litigation was a reasonably costly proposition because of the time and
distance involved in seeing a case through the judicial system.
Many of these problems had been addressed by the late 1880s,
however, through procedural innovations. For example, by at
least the mid-1880s, a printed form had been developed for use in
making water claims. The form offered claimants advantages in
filing claims by providing a means of ensuring that all necessary
183 In one opinion, the Montana Supreme Court was moved to note, in hopes that
its remarks would serve as an example of "a practice which we hope will hereafter
be avoided," that
[o]ur labors in the case before us would have been somewhat simplified,
and, indeed, would be generally simplified in water right cases, by having
incorporated into the record a diagram of the situation of the ditches over
which the litigation has arisen. Witnesses upon the trial of such causes are
apt to presume that the jurors and the trial judge have some personal
knowledge of the lay of the land, and of the ditches conducting water
thereto. This assumption is perhaps often well taken as applied to jurymen,
who frequently know the more important ditches and water claims in their
counties, and therefore easily comprehend the full meaning of a witness
when he refers to a ditch by the local name given it in the neighborhood,
and it may be that the trial judge is well enough acquainted with the section
to readily understand the meaning of any such reference; but when the case
comes to the appellate court, and the testimony is, for instance, that "on
the north side the wheat crop could not be irrigated by the McLaren ditch,"
and there is no map to convey any idea of north, south, east or west, or to
illustrate where the McLaren ditch is, and no lucid explanation of its situation, the task of locating it becomes laborious, and can only be performed
by deductions from scattering statements of the several witnesses who referred to the ditch as if every one knew of its owner, course and size.
Wood v. Lowney, 50 P. 794, 794-95 (Mont. 1897).
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information was recorded.' 84 Even without printed forms, however, those interested in securing their rights in water produced

85
thorough legal descriptions to file in county clerks' offices.'
As a path out of the commons in the uncertain conditions of
the newly settled West, the common law of prior appropriation
offered two major advantages. First, under the common law individuals are left free to innovate, putting the burden on those who
object to an innovation to show they were harmed by the
change. 18 6 Second, Coasian bargaining around common law decisions is possible, allowing parities to correct mistaken official
decisions through private action.18 7

III
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WYOMING SYSTEM

The preceding section presented a picture of a common law of
prior appropriation functioning tolerably well in both Montana
and Wyoming. Why then did Wyoming undertake such a radical
change when she gained statehood in 1889? In particular, given
the lack of water rights court cases in Wyoming compared to
Montana, why was it that Wyoming undertook to revolutionize
water law? The answer lies outside the specific area of water law
and in the larger political struggle dominating Wyoming in the
1880s and early 1890s. I now briefly summarize that struggle to
put the change in water law into context.
A.

Conditions in Wyoming

88

Wyoming's development differed from the development of
many of the other western states. Unlike most, Wyoming offered
no significant gold deposits and so never experienced a placer
gold rush. Indeed, for a time after the railroad crossed Wyoming,
184 See, e.g., Statement of Claim Under Oath to District Clerk to Water Right (on
file with the American Heritage Center, Laramie, Wyo., Davis and Thomas Collection, Accession #16, Box 1, Folder "Statements of Water Rights").
185 See, e.g., Notice of Water Rights and Irrigating Ditch (on file with the American Heritage Center, Warren Collection, Accession #13, Box 294, Folder 10 (hand-

written claim filed in 1885)).
186 See Yandle & Morriss, supra note 11, at 147.
187 See id. at 148.
188 This section draws heavily on Andrew P. Morriss, Law on the Range

(unpublished manuscript, on file with author): Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes &
Cattlemen, supra note 64: and Andrew P. Morriss, Returning Justice to Its Private
Roots, 68 U. CHi. L. REv. 551 (2001) (review).
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there was talk of disestablishing the territorial government.18 9
Wyoming lacked gold,' 9 ° but it had plenty of grass.1 9' As a
result, the free range cattle industry spread through Wyoming
Territory during the 1870s and 1880s1 92 and the territory soon
came to be dominated
by large free range cattle outfits run by
"cattle kings.' 1 93
Wyoming in the era of the cattle kings was largely shaped by
three sets of institutions: the cattle industry, the homestead laws,
and the relative informality of the legal system. 194 Although the
range cattle industry spread throughout the West after the Civil
War, it took a peculiar form in Wyoming. Wyoming Territory
presented both extraordinary opportunities for cattlemen and
unique difficulties. The opportunities lay in the seemingly endless plains filled with grass waiting to be eaten and transformed
into meat bound for the Chicago meatpackers. t 95 The difficulties
were related to the impossibility of acquiring significant amounts
of that grass as private property.
Wyoming was made up of large tracts of public property, unavailable for sale but open to homesteading in small tracts, and
large tracts of railroad property. 9 6 The "checkboarding"' 97 of
the railroad property meant that the one large private landowner
was unable to use or sell large, contiguous parcels of land. 98 The
189 See T.A. LARSON, HISTORY OF WYOMING 119-20 (2d ed. rev. 1978) (describing

discussion of eliminating territory).

190 LEWIS L. GOULD, WYOMING: A POLITICAL HISTORY,

1868-1896,

at 9 (1968).

191 Id. at 10.
SMITH, THE WAR ON POWDER RIVER 9-11 (1966);
note 109, at 384-85.
193 "[B]etween 1882 and 1886 ninety-three cattle companies with a capitalization
of more than $51,000,000, incorporated in Wyoming." GOULD, supra note 190, at
66.
192 HELENA

HUNTINGTON

HAMILTON, supra

194 See Morriss, Law on the Range, supra note 188; Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes &

Cattlemen, supra note 64, at 652-59, 666-68.
195 See GOULD. supra note 190. at 65 (describing "limitless grazing lands and huge
herds").

196 The Union Pacific received over 4.5 million acres of land in Wyoming. The
federal government owned almost half the territory's surface rights and more than
three-quarters of the mineral rights. LARSON, supra note 189, at 63, 539.
197 Checkerboarding was the practice of allocating railroads alternating sections
of land on either side of their tracks as an incentive and aid to construction. The
intervening sections remained publicly owned. The consequence was, however, that
neither the railroad nor the government could then sell a contiguous tract of more
than one section along the rail line.
198 Cattle operations required at least four sections to be successful and even
under liberal interpretations of federal land law only a quarter of that could be leWEBB, supra note 18, at 393, 412, 415.

gally obtained.
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"rigid allegiance to the letter of the homestead system" by the
Cleveland administration and its Wyoming appointees in 1885-88
only made matters worse. 199 Thus, a cattleman who sought to
20 0
privatize the commons through purchase was unable to do so.
The desirability of creating such parcels can be seen in the extralegal measures cattlemen attempted to utilize to acquire the
parcels despite the lack of land for sale.2 °1 Cattlemen fenced
public lands in a variety of innovative ways, attempting to develop a means of exclusion that would stand up in the courts.20 2
All these attempts fell before the fence cutters of the soldiers
20 3
sent to remove the illegal fences.
The cattle industry was able to develop despite the lack of private property because in the 1870s Wyoming had few residents to
object to the appropriation of the public domain. In the early
days, a rancher chose a headquarters, usually along a stream. 2°4
"At first he had no neighbors, and his range covered about all
the country that the cattle wanted to roam over; but after a time
another ranchman would establish himself" nearby on the same
stream.20 5 As more neighbors arrived, the range was divided,
even though no rancher legally owned the range land. 20 6 A
rancher "did possess what was recognized by his neighbors (but
not by law) as range rights"-a right to water and to the surrounding range. 20 7 Cattle, if not people, were plentiful: by 188520 8
86, there were probably about 1.5 million cattle in Wyoming.
Cattlemen developed means of solving the common problem
supra note 190, at 106.
That such purchases were desirable can be seen from the experience of Texas,
where public land was held by the state rather than the federal government and
transactions involving millions of acres were possible. The XIT (or "Ten in Texas")
ranch, for example, was created when a syndicate of investors traded a $3 million
state capitol building for three million acres in the Texas panhandle. PAUL I. WELL199 GOULD,

200

MAN, THE TRAMPLING HERD

281-83 (1939).

Such measures were popular among residents of Wyoming, who "were willing
to tolerate fraud in the land system in exchange for the ability to acquire their own
holdings as quickly as possible." GOULD, supra note 190, at 86-87.
202 LARSON, supra note 189, at 179; WEBB, supra note 18, at 238.
201

203 GOULD, supra note 190, at 85-86 (describing fence cutting campaign by federal
officials); see also JOSEPH KINSEY HOWARD, MONTANA HIGH, WIDE, AND HANDSOME 109 (1959); LARSON, supra note 189, at 179-80.
204 WEBB, supra note 18, at 228.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 229.
207 Id.
208 LARSON, supra note 189, at 167. Herd size fell about fifteen percent in the
severe winter of 1886-87. Id. at 191.
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amongst themselves. Cooperative roundups and cattlemens' association rules allowed them to share the costs of improving
stock and apportion the "free- grass.
These customary range rights, however, proved ineffective at
stopping the homesteaders who began to arrive in force in the
1880s. At the same time that cattlemen were barred from acquiring economically viable parcels, homesteaders could legally acquire land, albeit in uneconomical sizes. Homesteading
encouraged settlement even before farming would be economical
in a region, in effect making the price of land include years of
hardship while waiting to make farming economically viable.2 °9
The size of homestead claims set with eastern conditions in mind,
not the arid lands, were too small to allow a homesteader to survive: 160 acres was simply not adequate in much of the West.
The ill effects of the homestead policy were aggravated by the
use of a grid for surveys. Since surveys did not follow the topology, many sections were left without water.2 1 °
In addition to the problems caused by the homestead laws, le209 See Richard L. Stroup, Buying Misery with Federal Land, 57 PUB. CHOICE 69,
70-71 (1988); Terry L. Anderson & P. J. Hill, The Race for PropertyRights, 33 J.L. &
ECON. 177, 195 (1990) ("[Plioneers paid for the land in terms of foregone wealth,
privations, and hardships."). But see Douglas W. Allen, Homesteading and Property
Rights; or, "How The West Was Really Won," 34 J.L. & ECON. 1, 22-23 (1991) (arguing homesteading served important purpose of establishing U.S. control of empty
lands before Mexico, Britain, Texas, Spain, Russia, or Indians could preclude American expansion).
210 HOWARD, supra note 203, at 35; see also ERNEST STAPLES OSGOOD,THE DAY
OF THE CATTLEMAN 18 (1929) (describing how customary legal institutions function
in areas of Spanish and Mexican settlement to allocate water access and concluding
that "[t]he survey and sale of this land in regular sections would probably drive out
the present population .... ). But see Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 705-19 (Cal. 1886)
(disputing that appropriation under Mexican law was inconsistent with riparian
rights).
Although too small for long term economic viability, a 160-acre parcel did allow
control of a much larger area of surrounding lands if the 160 acres included the only
water in the area. Cattlemen attempted to homestead parcels with water both with
their family members and with trusted employees, but they were unable to do so on
a large enough scale to block the homesteaders. Once a homesteader settled in, he
sometimes fenced his parcel to keep out the roaming cattle herds-keeping the cattle from both his crops and the water that flowed across his land. Morriss, Law on
the Range, supra note 188. The fences also blocked the cattle from drifting before
winter storms, leading to increased losses. A.S. MERCER, THE BANDITTI OF THE
PLAINS; OR THE CATrLEMEN'S INVASION OF WYOMING IN 1892 [THE CROWNING
INFAMY OF THE

AGES] 13 (U. Okla. Press 1954) (1894).

Homesteaders came in increasing numbers in the 1880s as the federal government
and railroads actively promoted settlement in arid regions incapable of supporting
small scale farming in the long term. OSGOOD, supra, at 43-44.
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gal infrastructure was scarce, and correspondingly expensive
throughout the West. Formal legal institutions were relatively
few and far between in the early days of the plains cattle industry. This led the cattlemen to develop their own customary legal

institutions. 21'

Thrown together by economic necessity for

roundups, and by social conditions in Cheyenne where the dominant social institutions were built around the cattle industry,2 t2

the cattle kings found common action relatively easy. Combined
with their natural prominence in political affairs because of their
great wealth, they began to treat the boundaries between the territorial government and the cattlemen's association as blurred.
The Wyoming cattle kings clashed with homesteaders over a
variety of issues, not just control of land and water. In part, the
conflict was due to the incompatibility of farming and ranching:
"The farmer's fence has cut across [the cattleman's] range and his
bewildered cattle and horses have blundered into it."' 2 3 Another
reason for conflict was the pressure put on the range by overstocking, 2 14 itself due to the government's insistence that Wyoming was a commons. The increasing numbers of cattle grazing
in Wyoming through the mid-1880s,2 1 5 for example, contributed
to the disaster of the winter of 1886-87.2l6
As Walter Prescott Webb put it:
The cattle kingdom was a world within itself, with a culture all its own,
which, though of brief duration, was complete and self-satisfying. The cattle kingdom worked out its own means and methods of utilization; it formulated its own law, called the code of the West, and did it largely upon
extra-legal grounds.
WEBB, supra note 18, at 206.
212 See Morriss, Law on the Range, supra note 188.
213 HOWARD, supra note 203, at 13; see also II GRANVILLE STUART, FORTY
YEARS ON THE FRONrIER 187 (Paul C. Phillips ed., 1925) ("The cattlemen did not
want to see fences on the range as during severe storms the cattle drifted for miles
and if they should strike a fence they were likely to drift against it and perish with
the cold.").
214 Overstocking caused a variety of problems--there was not enough food and
shelter on the range for all the cattle, cattle paths caused erosion, and streams dried
up (in part because beaver were trapped out and their dams no longer retained
moisture). ATHERTON, supra note 6, at 156. Native grasses also were replaced by
brush. Id. at 165.
215 Part of the increase was due to the 1885 eviction of 200,000 cattle from leased
lands in Indian Territory (Oklahoma). SMiTH, supra note 192, at 125.
216 1886-87 was a terrible year for the cattle business in Wyoming. The summer of
1886 was a severe drought, "more cattle than ever before had been piled onto the
range" and still more cattle were being brought into Wyoming. Id. at 35-36. When
the severe winter hit, some herds lost more than ninety percent. Id. at 36-37. The
result of the combination of bad weather, mismanagement, and overstocking was
211
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Other conflicts centered on the homesteaders' treatment of the
range cattle, in addition to the land, as a commons. The experience of the early 1880s convinced many cattle kings of the need
for fencing, herd management, and even winter feeding.2 1 7 Cattlemen also began to improve their herds with higher grade cattle.2 18 Homesteaders who ran a small number of cattle could
free-ride on the high grade bulls provided by the ranchers.
Worse, they asserted claims to a share of the "mavericks," unbranded cattle found during a general roundup.2 19 Open range
ranching meant there were many of these mavericks, 2 20 and, at
first, anyone with a branding iron could claim a maverick.2 21
These conflicts were not contested on a level playing field. Political power in Wyoming was firmly in the hands of the cattle
kings.2 22 In 1890, the first year of statehood, eight of the twelve
members of the upper house of the legislature were members of
the cattlemen's association.22 3 That association
not only controlled the legislature, it had a friend in the governor's chair, friends on the bench, and a friend in the White
House in Washington (President Benjamin Harrison) who
were subservient to its wishes. It had, in short, or it was, a
machine which ruled Wyoming.22 4
This dominance was also reflected in the constitutional convention, where prominent cattlemen like H.E. Teschemaker
"the most appalling mass slaughter of animals the West had ever seen or would see
again, second only to the slaughter of the buffalo." Id. at 38. The average loss in
Wyoming was probably about fifty percent. Id. at 46. Absentee ownership accentuated the problems creating "all the abuses common to absentee ownership." OsGOOD, supra note 210, at 103-04. Even this disaster only accelerated the changes in
the industry already under way, however, and did not cause an abrupt change in
ranching techniques. ATHERTON, supra note 6, at 5.
217 ATHERTON, supra note 6, at 168-69.
218 WEBB, supra note 18, at 239.
219 Mavericks were largely calves which were missed during a roundup or which
were orphaned. SMITH, supra note 192, at 51. They also included unbranded mature cattle.
220 The huge roundups conducted each year contributed to the maverick problem
because their huge size and speed meant more cattle were missed, and so more
unbranded calves grew up on the range. Id. at 33-34.
221 LARSON, supra note 189, at 182-83.
222 Although Gould argues that the cattle kings were less powerful than other
historians have claimed, he concedes that the Association members in the legislature
"acted as a cohesive unit" on cattle-related measures. GOULD, supra note 190, at 70.
223 SMITH, supra note 192, at 85.
224 Id. There are significant parallels with federal water projects in the United
States in the twentieth century. See REISNER, supra note 3, for an account of federal water projects.
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served as delegates, and others, like Francis Warren and Joseph
Carey, played significant roles behind the scenes.2 2 5 As the
Cheyenne Daily Leader reported on the first day of the convention, "perhaps a regular council of war was not held" by the
state's powerful "but quiet scheming seemed to be the order of
22 6
the day,
Despite the financial problems caused by the harsh winters of
the mid-1880s, the cattle kings, those who controlled the association, remained dominant, in part because there was little competition. "The harsh climate, combined with the regional aridity,
reduced farming to a marginal economic activity in much of the
territory. '22 7 The Union Pacific, which had dominated the territory in the early 1880s, had declined in influence, "employing
only seven percent of [the] territorial work force" by the time of
the constitutional convention.2 2 8
Irrigation, however, was a significant business in Wyoming by
the end of the 1880s. As a Cheyenne Daily Leader editorial in
January 1889 boasted,
a distinctive feature of Wyoming's irrigation is the fact that it
outstrips all the states and territories in the number of streams
available for irrigation. In every part of the territory are
favorable locations for the investment of capital in the construction of irrigation works of great magnitude. The records
show 22
1,718
ditches completed, watering an area of 1,260,000
9
acres.

Such a business gave the cattle kings important interests to
protect in legislation and constitutional provisions dealing with
water rights.
Wyoming's cattle kings set out to solve their conflicts with
small holders through a variety of means. They banded together
(and appropriated territorial funds) to hire stock detectives to
chase down rustlers. In the legislature they passed laws authorizing the seizure of cattle with "rustler brands" and allocating mav230
ericks to themselves.
225 KEITER & NEWCOMB, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that it has been suggested
that Warren, Carey, and territorial chief justice Willis Van Devanter "constituted 'an
invisible delegation of extraordinary power'").
226 It is in Session, CHEYENNE DAILY LEADER, Sept. 3, 1889, at 2.
227 KEITER & NEWCOMB, supra note 10, at 2.
228

Id.

Jan. 27, 1889, (on file with the
American Heritage Center, Carey Collection, Accession #1212, Box 15, Scrapbook).
230 See Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes & Cattlemen, supra note 64, at 667-70.
229 Editorial (untitled), CHEYENNE DAILY LEADER,

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80, 2001 ]

Despite all their efforts, however, they were unable to end
their troubles with homesteaders for two main reasons. First,
they could not stop the flow of homesteaders into the territory,
because the federal land laws creating the incentives were beyond their control. Second, even where they controlled the
mechanisms of government in Wyoming, one institution remained beyond their grasp: local juries. Despite their extensive
and expensive efforts to track down rustlers, for example, the
cattle kings were unable to win many convictions in court because jurors refused to accept the associations' detectives'
testimony.23
On the eve of statehood, a group of cattlemen took drastic action: two alleged rustlers, Ella Watson and James Averell, were
lynched in 1889.232 Watson, alleged to be a prostitute in many
accounts, was accused of accepting stolen cattle in payment for
her services and Averell was accused of rustling, although historian Helena Huntington Smith concluded these charges were
"based on the flimsiest sort of hearsay." 233 Watson and Averell
also were homesteading some land one of the cattle kings wanted
and had refused to sell out. 23 4 Historian George Hufsmith argues persuasively that Watson and Averell were innocent settlers
and that the myth of prostitution and rustling was created by the
cattle interests to cover up their real motive for lynching the
two-to gain control of their land.23 5
One of the most striking features of the lynching was the widespread positive publicity it generated for the cattlemen. 3 6 Indeed, the secretary of the cattlemen's association wrote to a
member after the lynching that the lynchers "simply did what
many of us would like to do but we dare not in other parts of the
range. If thieving on the range is to be stopped, it must be done
by just such heroic measures. '237 After statehood the cattlemen
launched an ever more ambitious attempt to kill their oppo231 See SMITH, supra note 192, at 81; GOULD, supra note 190, at 139.
232 SMITH, supra
233 SMITH, supra

note 192, at 121-34:
note 193, at 121.

MERCER, supra

note 210, at 17-20.

234 Id. at 122-23; MERCER, supra note 210, at 18-19.
235 GEORGE W. HUFSMITH, THE WYOMING LYNCHING OF CATTLE KATE

1889

(1993).
236 See SMITH, supra note 192, at 126-29.
237 Letter from the Wyoming Stock Growers Association to B. Connor (July 28,

1889) (on file with the American Heritage Center, Wyoming Stock Growers Association Collection, Accession #14, Box 3, "Letters Volume 10 1888").
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nents-the "Invasion" of Johnson County.2 38
Finally, the cattle kings had their fingers in many pies. Indeed,
as a newspaper article noted, "the Wyoming cattleman is a versatile genius" and so "nothing is more natural than that the range
cattle growers who once were undisputed possessors of vast acres
of government lands should now be expending vast sums in reclaiming the desert plains and devoting the same to agricultural
uses." 239 Joseph Carey, for example, was not only a prominent
cattleman and political figure, but was also a major investor in a
variety of businesses, including the Wyoming Development Company (WDC). The WDC had enormous interests in irrigation
and water rights. An 1890s telegram from a bond dealer in Chicago, for example, promised the WDC that "the probabilities are
that we will have very little trouble in handling the million dollar
issue" the company sought, giving a sense of the scale on which it
operated.2 40
The WDC advertised in 1886 that it had constructed "more
than five hundred canals and ditches, extending over 1,000 miles
in length and covering at least 100,000 acres. '241 However, the
WDC could not secure title to the land it was providing water
for, and so its ability to reap the reward for its investment was
uncertain at best. Indeed, in June 1889 Elwood Mead wrote to
Francis Warren, then governor of the territory, arguing that the
"unsuitability of the land laws" had put the WDC into "a very
unpleasant predicament. '24 2 People had filed land claims on
property that the company's canals would reach in an attempt
"to secure the greater portion of this unearned increment of increased value" due to the availability of irrigation. The company
had therefore taken steps to dispossess the speculators, who had
in turn managed to block the WDC's friends' land titles at the
General Land Office. Mead therefore sought Warren's assistance to lobby the federal government, so that irrigation could be
encouraged by allowing irrigators to claim the benefits of their
238 See Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes & Cattlemen, supra note 64, at 666-76.
239 Not in the Way of Progress (newspaper clipping on file with the American

Heritage Center, Carey Collection, Accession #1212, Box 15, Scrapbook).
240 Telegram from E.C. Gibson to Jos. Carey (July 26, 189?) (on file with the
American Heritage Center, Carey Collection, Accession #1212, Box 8).
241 Wyoming Development Company Brochure (on file with the American Heritage Center, Carey Collection, Accession #1212, Box 8).
242 Letter from Elwood Mead to Francis Warren (June 15, 1889) (on file with the
American Heritage Center, Carey Collection, Accession #1212, Box 8).
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investments. Because of the lack of property rights, the cattlemen could not voluntarily and peacefully acquire the land that
benefited from their investments in irrigation infrastructure.
This created an opportunity for an alternative institutional solution, and Elwood Mead had one to offer.
B.

Elwood Mead, Policy Entrepreneur

In 1888 three leading citizens associated with the cattle industry pushed legislation creating the post of Territorial Engineer
through the legislature.2 4 3 They invited Elwood Mead, a thirtyyear-old engineer from Colorado, to take the position. Mead was
24
an ambitious reformer with a zeal for water law.
Mead had served in the Colorado State Engineer's office and
so was familiar with that system, which relied on litigation to determine water rights.24 5 He was, however, young and untested.
Even Mead supporter Francis Warren initially complained that
Mead was "still wearing pinafores ' 246 and Territorial Governor
Thomas Moonlight advised Mead to turn the job down.24 7
Whether Mead was responsible for the rise of the Wyoming
system is debatable. One explanation for the Wyoming system is
that Mead was a "visionary," frustrated by Colorado's failure to
adopt his reforms. 248 Mead certainly seems like a visionary-he
had bold ideas about what appropriate water policy (and other
policies) should be and did not hesitate to seize opportunities to
implement his vision through the use of state power. For example, like many in the late nineteenth century Mead saw private
monopoly as a critical problem and used his office to institute
243 KLUGER,

supra note 44, at 15 (attributing bill to James A. Johnston, Gibson

Clark, and Francis Warren). On Warren's cattle industry connections, see GOULD,
supra note 190, at 79. On Johnston's connections see infra notes 266-67 and accompanying text. On Clark, see PROGRESSIVE MEN OF THE STATE OF WYOMING 472,
473 (1903) (noting that Clark was appointed to the Wyoming Supreme Court in
1892, while the cattlemen controlled the state government, and that he moved in
"the best society circles" in Cheyenne, placing him among the state's elite).
244 KLUGER, supra note 44, at 15.
245 The Colorado Adjudication Acts of 1879 and 1881 provided for litigation to
determine rights, under supervision of the state engineer. 1879 Colo. Session Laws
99-100; 1881 Colo. Session Laws 142.
246 KLUGER, supra note 44, at 15.
247 Id.
248 See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 70, at 7 ("Frustrated by Colorado's refusal to
accept his proposals for state administration of water rights, Mead moved from Fort
Collins to Laramie in 1888, just before Wyoming statehood, to serve as the first
territorial engineer.").
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reforms aimed at blocking it. 2 49 However, another possible explanation for the Wyoming system is that small water consumers
used the Wyoming system to freeze favorable doctrines into administrative rules."' A third is that the prior system was grossly
inefficient. For example, Hutchins describes the problem with
the common law of prior appropriation as being that
[t]here was nothing in the posting and filing method-as it operated in actual practice-to prevent an intending appropriator from initiating a right and beginning construction of work,
so long as he was not stopped by litigation. This was the case
even though claims on file often reached absurd totals. The
administrative procedure, on the other hand, aimed at discouraging the making of applications for water in streams with respect to which the administrator had determined, for his own
official purposes, that appropriative rights in being already
laid claim to more water than the stream carried in ordinary
seasons. It tended to warn the would-be appropriator of the
risk, in quantitative measure, that he would run of having his
right attach to only high floodflows, if he insisted on carrying it
through to completion. Of course, he might obtain a storage
right of considerable value. But the only available direct flow
right might be such as to give him access to water
only in occa2 51
sional years, or at least only in early seasons.
All of these explanations miss several crucially important facts.
First, as outlined above, Wyoming was controlled by the powerful businessmen, the same men who were also the free range cattle interests. It is unlikely that a young engineer from Colorado
took these powerful interests by surprise. Moreover, small water
users were not a significant force in Wyoming politics. Even if
they had wanted to turn water rights questions over to a new
administrative agency, it is unlikely that they could have done so
against the wishes of the range cattle industry.
Second, small holders were doing well under the common law,
particularly compared to how they were faring in the legislature.25 2 Throughout the 1880s, water rights were being regularly
249 See Thompson, supra note 104, at 3.
250 See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 70, at 7 ("Initially, small users installed the
court-made rules in state statutes and, importantly, in the workings of state adminis-

trative agencies.").
supra note 7, at 313.
252 The cattlemen's frustration at the common law courts' failure to accept their
paid stock detectives' testimony in rustling cases, for example, shows the independence of the judicial system for the small holders and the problems it caused for the
cattle kings. Compare the cattle kings' success in the area of maverick legislation
with their frustration over the rustling cases.
251 1 HUTCHINS,
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established in Wyoming.2 53 There is thus little reason why they
would have sought such a change.
Third, there was a group with both the motive and the means
to affect a change: the businessmen who were the range cattle
interests. Regularly losing rustling cases in the courts, the range
cattlemen would be clear beneficiaries of shifting control of an
important resource out of the courts and to a state agency.
Moreover, the inexperienced Mead, coming to the job from Colorado, would have no independent power base and so would be
susceptible to guidance from the politically powerful interests
who secured his appointment. 4 Indeed, despite his later writings and efforts on behalf of small holders, Mead showed considerable realpolitik skills in Wyoming. For example, in his 1889
letter on behalf of Carey's Wyoming Development Company to
Francis Warren, Mead argued that the land laws, whatever their
"technical construction ... may be," needed to be altered to reward investors like Carey.2 5 5 The rewards were necessary because the task of irrigation required large investments and
because "the works of this company are of the type demanded by
our future conditions and necessities. ' 256 Mead closed with the
thought that "it would seem proper that the authorities in control
of these matters [land claims] should be informed in order that
justice should be done and the enterprise and public spirit that
produced them, be properly recognized. '25 7 A great deal of
money was at stake-a U.S. Senator visiting Wyoming as part of
an investigation into irrigation legislation during the constitutional convention estimated that irrigation would convert "essentially worthless" land into fifty dollars an acre 25 8 or even three
hundred dollars an acre. 9
Fourth, Mead was hardly alone in proposing centralization of
water resources. In California, for example, State Engineer Wil253 See Robert Homer Burns, Water Vital to Man and Beast: The Life-Blood of
the Laramie Plains, in ROBERT HOMER BURNS ET AL., WYOMING'S PIONEER
RANCHES 681 (1955) ("The decade from 1880 to 1890 was a very busy one for the
ranchmen were making water filings continually and digging ditches whenever the
ground was not frozen.").
254 See KLUGER, supra note 44, at 15 (noting that Mead's candidacy was pushed
on the governor by "persistent pressure").
255 Letter, Mead to Warren, supra note 242.
256 Id.
257

Id.

258

Senatorial Visitors, CHEYENNE
Magical Irrigation, CHEYENNE

259

DAILY LEADER,
DAILY LEADER,

Sept. 17, 1889, at 2.
Sept. 19, 1889, at 1.
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liam Hammond Hall led a determined and unsuccessful campaign for central planning of water (by him) from 1878 to
1888.60 The key difference was that Hammond and others failed
while Mead succeeded. It hardly seems likely that a young, outof-territory engineer with no power base of his own could triumph without powerful interests finding reason to support him,
where more sophisticated and politically powerful men repeatedly failed elsewhere.
Fifth, Wyoming Constitution Article VIII 61 was written and
championed by Mead, James A. Johnston and Charles H. Burritt,
later mayor of Buffalo, Wyoming. 62 Burritt was "the most active member on behalf of the establishment of the irrigation code
and the provisions for irrigation in the constitution. 2 6 3 As an
attorney Burritt went on to defend the Johnson County Invaders
in the aftermath of the failed Invasion, 26 allying himself with the
260 Charles P. Korr, William Hammond Hall: The Failure of Attempts at State
Water Planning in California, 1878-1888, 45 S. CAL. Q. 305 (1963).
261 The full committee on agriculture and irrigation was Johnston, Burdick, Irvine
Sutherland, Holder, Baldwin, and Burritt. They Are At Work, CHEYENNE DAILY
LEADER, Sept. 6, 1889, at 3. Burritt introduced the proposal on September 7, 1889.
Plenty Provisions, CHEYENNE DAILY LEADER, Sept. 8, 1889, at 3. The initial proposal by Burritt was for three sections. Section one called for the convention to establish a state board of irrigation commissioners; section two assigned them "a general
supervision of the appropriation, distribution and division of the waters of the
state;" and section three declared that "all waters within the boundaries of the State
are the property of the State." Some Articles of the Constitution, 1889,
microformed on Constitutional Convention, Wyoming, File No. 35, Secretary of
State, Microfilm #1299 (Wyoming State Archives, Cheyenne, Wyo.).
262 LARSON, supra note 189, at 254. Burritt is described by Hubert Howe Bancroft as one of the "individual owners" engaged in stock raising. 25 HUBERT HOWE
BANCROFT, THE WORKS OF HUBERT HOWE BANCROFT 792 n.15 (San Francisco,
History Co. 1890).
263 Charles H. Burritt Left His Mark on Pioneer Life of Early Buffalo, BUFFALO
BULL., Aug. 17, 1961, at 1. Burritt also claimed that water issues were critically
important to Johnson County. Irrigation and Water Rights, Bic HORN SENTINEL,
Sept. 21, 1889, at 3. Burritt's contemporaries were well aware of his interests-one
delegate hinted that "corporate interests [were] involved in this question," drawing
an angry response from Burritt that included an admission of his "connection" with
"parties owning irrigation ditches in Johnson County." WYOMING CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION,

JOURNAL AND DEBATES

OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF

535 (1893) [hereinafter

CONST. CONVENTION J.].
264 LARSON, supra note 189, at 283, 279. Before the Invasion, Burritt was one of
three signatories to an affidavit filed with the state supreme court outlining the activities of an alleged "very large and organized band of stock-thieves and persons who
have no respect for and openly and frequently violate the laws of the state." Affidavit of Charles H. Burritt, Horace R. Mann, and Thomas J. Bouton (on file with the
American Heritage Center, Carey Collection, Accession #1212, Box 13, Folder 3. at
THE STATE OF WYOMING

1).
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cattlemen in their attempt to use force to drive out their opponents. Johnston was from Laramie County, a strong cattlemen's
26 5
region and home of one of the first stockmen's associations.

He had a long-standing interest in "the preservation of the waters of Wyoming," dating back to 1883, according to the Wyoming Historical Blue Book. 26 6 This was hardly surprising since

Johnston was a participant with Carey and others in the Wyoming Development Company, whose fortunes depended in large
measure on irrigation.267 Others prominent at the convention
also were tied closely to the cattlemen, as shown by the fact that
they later participated in or assisted the Invasion. 268 This group
was able to exercise great influence because many of the other

members of the convention were ignorant of the details of water
law. 269

Sixth, the Wyoming constitutional convention's actions regarding water are atypical of its dominant political philosophy in several respects. The water sections relied heavily on an
administrative apparatus at a time when this was unusual 27° and
doubly surprising given "the convention's sense of faith in the
judiciary as a guardian of individual rights, a faith that was not
265 LARSON, supra note 189, at 170, 254.
266 MARIE H. ERWIN, WYOMING HISTORICAL BLUE BOOK 636 (1943).

267 See Record Book of Wyoming Development Company 97, 172 (on file with
the American Heritage Center, Carey Collection, Accession #1212, Box 8) (noting
Johnston to be a trustee of company in 1892 and president in 1894).
268 See LARSON, supra note 189, at 283 ("[A]t least five of the leaders of the 1889

constitutional convention were involved in the Invasion.").
269 See, e.g., CONST. CONVENTION J., supra note 263, at 501 (Delegate Smith:

"[W]e have advanced just far enough in water interests to realize the importance of
this matter, beyond that we might say we know almost nothing."); Delegate Smith:
"We don't know whether this proposed system is a wise one, yet we are putting it in
the Constitution." Id. at 502; Delegate Brown: "I do not like to talk about a matter
about which I am not very well informed, and I desire to confess to this convention
that I do not think I am very well informed upon this question of irrigation." Id.
Delegate Conway: "It seems to me, considering the importance of this matter, and
the evident lack of consideration we have given it, we should not pass these sections
over so rapidly. I for myself feel that I am too ignorant to vote upon it intelligently."
Id. at 498.
Interestingly, one of the few "no" votes on Article VII came from the president of
the convention, Melville C. Brown, a man whose selection as president had been
reported as one of the rare public defeats for the "Warren-Carey faction." See President Brown, CHEYENNE DAILY LEADER, Sept. 4, 1889, at 3. On Brown's "no" vote,
see The Supreme Court, CHEYENNE DAILY LEADER, Sept. 22, 1889, at 3 (noting that

Brown voted no because he feared Article VIII "gave corporations an opportunity
to defraud the public").
270 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 301.
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reflected in its view of legislative or executive power." 27 ' The
Wyoming Constitution contained "an exceptionally large number
of provisions relating to water" and "created the first complete
water rights administrative organization in the West."27' 2 This
structure, unique in western water law, gave the State Engineer
(initially Mead) authority over acquisition of appropriative rights
and gave the Board of Control (the State Engineer plus four
water division superintendents) authority over adjudication of
controversies. 271 Wyoming's centralization of power was
unique-the agency "not only exercised comprehensive control
over the distribution of water to appropriators, but received and
acted upon applications for permits to appropriate water under
an exclusive procedure, and adjudicated water rights by means of
orders or decrees which were final unless appealed to the
courts. ' 274 The uniqueness of Article VIII is contrasted with the
substantial portion (albeit less than half) of the constitution that
was borrowed from other states' constitutions.2 75
Seventh, the progress of and debates 276 in the Wyoming Constitutional Convention on Article VIII offer some support for my
interpretation. The initial proposal concentrated on the key
points of state ownership and central planning; only later did the
superstructure of the apparatus develop. 27 7 Delegate M.C.
Brown of Albany County, for example, argued that the assertion
of ownership of "all the waters in the state, whether they have
been acquired by prior appropriation or not" was necessary because without it, "the people who have appropriated a portion of
the water [would be] absolute owners of it." Without state
ownership,
it would be utterly impossible for the legislature, or any power
of the State, to control, regulate, or in any manner interfere
with its use. It is only by the declaration that we are to be the
absolute owners of all the water that we may be able
278 to control unreservedly the uses to which it may be put.
271 KEITER & NEWCOMB, supra note 10, at 7.

272 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 300.
273 Id. at 307. The first Board of Control was made up of Mead, James A John-

ston, W.J. Clarke, N.J. Brown, and William Hinton. 1st Biennial Report, State of
Wyoming 1 (on file with author).
274 3 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 617-18.

10, at 4.
276 The constitutional convention was short-only twenty-five days of debate. Id.
275 KEITER & NEWCOMB, supra note

277 See supra note 261.
278 CONST. CONVENTION J., supra note 263, at 289.
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Burritt also argued along similar lines later in the debate that
"notwithstanding all the legislation of Congress, notwithstanding
all the constitutional provisions of Colorado and Wyoming, water
remains so far as the right to control it is concerned, with the
State, just the moment that a state comes into the union. ' 27 9 Because states had eminent domain powers, Burritt argued, it necessarily controlled water as well as land.28" But the convention
rejected a floor attempt to add language regulating irrigation
companies as common carriers.2 8 1
The Board of Control, which delegate Burritt acknowledged to
be "a still more radical change ' 28 2 than the assertion of state
ownership, was presented as necessary to correct the errors of
the courts. Burritt argued, for example, that to leave water rights
to the courts was to have
this thing wrong end to, that we have got the cart before the
horse in submitting a matter to the court about which they
have no knowledge, officially or practically, and to enable it to
get any knowledge it 283
would have to spend a series of years
studying the question.
As the Cheyenne Daily Leader put it, Burritt's speech was "a
revelation little short of the sensational .... The courts are irresponsible for the reason that the decisions are made on the ex
parte statements of interested persons. Many citizens yesterday
learned for the first time of the glaring evils of this ridiculous
system. ' 284 Interestingly, among the errors of the courts, Burritt
claimed, was that "large tracts are apportioned a few inches and
smaller ones several feet., 285 A member of the committee on
water rights argued that the new system would stop a claimant
from
rush[ing] out to the creek ... and without consulting anybody,
finding out anything about whether there is any water there or
not, he rushes in and begins a ditch, and rushes into court and
begins a lawsuit. Now this system proposes to revise the order
of things, and instead of rushing all over the country and beginning a ditch and taking chances about getting any water, we
propose to have them get permission to construct ditches from
279

Id. at 499.

280

Id.

281 Id. at 294-96.
282 Id. at 293.
283 Id. at 296.
284 Smith is a Schemer, CHEYENNE DAILY LEADER,
285 Id.

Sept. 13, 1889, at 3.
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the board of control. In other words, all the information necthe
essary to enable a man to do 28
6 wise thing in this matter will
be with the board of control.
It is difficult to imagine a change more favorable to the cattle
kings' interests.
Finally, events after the fact suggest that Article VIII is best
read as a power grab by the cattlemen. By 1894, for example,
James A. Johnston was the superintendent of Water Division No.
1, and so a member of the statewide Board of Control as well as
the primary administrator for one-fourth of the state. Johnston
was a stockholder in the Wyoming Development Company and
used his official stationery at least once to correspond with Senator Carey seeking advantage for the company.2 87
Mead's own arguments support this interpretation as well. He
argued that the state would have to be free to allocate water
among the "four important industrial elements" of domestic use,
livestock needs, irrigation, and mining and manufacturing. "It is
questionable," Mead wrote to the convention, "whether the diversion of their [streams'] water does not entail more loss and
damage on the grazing interests than it benefits agriculture from
its use in irrigation ... [and thus to] make irrigation a preferred

priority will seriously embarrass and injure one of our most stable and valuable resources. ' 288 Mead may have had his own reasons for centralized control, 289 but allowing a state board they
controlled to take charge of water rights would have been crucial
to the cattle kings' ability to withstand the homesteaders'
claims.2 9 ° With even the great champion of small holders arguing
cattle grazing's importance over irrigation, the cattlemen must
have been well satisfied with Mead's work.
C.

The Wyoming System as an Institution

The Wyoming system had two key features that distinguish it
286 CONST. CONVENTION J., supra note 263, at 504-05.
287 Letter from James A. Johnston to Senator Carey (June 20, 1894) (on file with
the American Heritage Center, Carey Collection, Accession #1212, Box 8).
2 88
An Important Letter, CHEYENNE DAILY LEADER, Sept. 13, 1889, at 2.
289 Mead argued centralization was necessary to ensure that the system "be
cheaply and effectively administered" by making its administration "as simple and

direct as is the management of a great railway system." Id.
290 Francis Warren's opponents in Wyoming so characterized his attempt to turn
federal lands over to the state (nominally intended to promote irrigation): "Once
the state owned the land, they asserted, Warren would manipulate the administrative machinery to increase his own holdings." GOULD, supra note 190, at 133.
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from the common law. First, the Wyoming system substituted a
central planner, generally the state engineer, for the decentralized judge and jury system as the primary decision maker in the
system. 291 As water law expert Wells Hutchins summarized the
innovation, it "produced for the first time an effective administrative control over making new appropriations, and coordinated
it with adjudication and distribution under an administrative hierarchy. '29 2 Having one decision maker made it possible for
greater consistency in decisions, 293 but also made interest group
capture a greater likelihood. This is just what happened. Wilkinson, for example, concludes that water agencies are "captured
agencies in the most extreme sense. 2 94
Second, water rights became dependent on the state, rather
than being property rights entitled to protection from the
state.29 5 Water, Mead wrote to the Wyoming constitutional convention, "is a public commodity which should only be utilized
and segregated by individuals in order that the public may be
benefited thereby. To accomplish this it should be under the control of the state. '296 Since the state "owned" the water and determined who could use it, water rights holders lost the potential
for constitutional protection from state action that they would
have had under the common law. This was a crucial element in
the Wyoming system. As Hutchins commented,
the purpose of a constitutional or statutory declaration of pub291 Appeals to the courts, of course, are possible but an appeal is not an original
proceeding and the facts are already determined. Moreover, Wyoming law provides
that while appeals are pending, water is to be distributed as ordered by the Board of
Control, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-408 (Michie 2001), and that in cases where a
stream runs through more than one judicial district or county, the Board of Control
determines which court will hear the appeal. Id. § 41-4-401.
292 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 301.
293 It is important to not overstate the case for centralization. "Gathering all an
externality's participants within a single regulatory unit does indeed provide benefits, and the larger the framework the more likely that result becomes. But most
hydrological externalities are confined to a basin, so the benefit is exhausted before
regulation becomes national." David D. Haddock, Must Water Regulation Be Centralized?, in WATER MARKETING, supra note 65, at 43, 44.
294 Wilkinson, supra note 70, at 11.
295 This was long the dominant view of water rights. For example, the leading
water scholar for much of the last part of the twentieth century, Professor Joseph
Sax, saw "the right to use water" as "a societal creation designed to promote social
value, not a natural right." Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Law as a Pragmatic

Exercise: Professor Joseph Sax's Water Scholarship, 25

ECOLOGY

L.Q. 363, 371

(1998).
296 An Important Letter, CHEYENNE DAILY LEADER,

supra note 288.
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lic or State ownership [of water] is to lay the foundation for
State control over the management and use of stream waters.... So far as State control and actual use of these flowing

waters is concerned, the significant and essential principle is
ownership in the corpus of the water does not
that private
297
exist.

The importance of state ownership is summarized in a brief
filed in a later water rights case: "[T]he state is the absolute
owner of the waters within its own boundaries and may regulate
and control them at will, provided all equal interests are equally
protected."2 9' 8 Since the courts failed to recognize water rights as
property rights deserving of compensation under the Takings
Clause of the U.S. Constitution when legislatures and regulators
altered the boundaries of the rights,2 9 9 legislators and regulators
faced lower costs resulting from such alterations.
One area in which legislatures began tinkering regularly was
the introduction of preference orderings to deal with conflicts
among uses. 300 "A typical ordering might run down from mostpreferred home and farm uses, through manufacturing, to power
and mining uses."' 0 ' Other variations on the initial first in time
principle were soon added: authority to reject appropriations as
''a menace to the safety or against the interests and welfare of the
public," preferences for particular uses, preferences for municipal uses, and withdrawal of water from general appropriation for
public uses. 3 2 To the extent that such transfers had an impact,
297 1

HUTCHINS,

supra note 7, at 141.

298 Brief of Davis and Thomas 3 (on file with the American Heritage Center, Davis and Thomas Collection, Accession #16, Box 1, Folder "Brief").
299 See Thompson, supra note 295, at 370 ("[I]n Sax's view, courts until recently
have consistently rejected constitutional claims to compensation brought by those
water users who believed their rights were damaged by legal change."). Of course,
appropriative rights are a form of property rights but they are property rights subject
to state redefinition at far lower cost than traditional property rights in land.
300 See I HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 158 ("[C]ertain States have authorized preferences and imposed restrictions upon appropriations made under prescribed statutory procedures, the effects of which under some circumstances is at variance from
the right of the first applicant to be accorded the first priority.").
301 Scott & Coustalin, supra note 51, at 918.
States that list beneficial uses in statutes normally began with a basic list
many years ago, covering the late nineteenth century needs of domestic
use, farming, and some industry, and then supplemented their statutes over
time to add more 'modern' purposes, such as instream uses for recreation
and fish and wildlife.
Neuman, supra note 64, at 924. States also sometimes specify in statutes that particular uses are not beneficial. Id.
302 1 HurCHINS, supra note 7, at 178-79.
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they represented a transfer of wealth from older, more senior
holders of rights engaged in less favored uses to holders of newer
rights, now privileged by their favored status-a classic example
of rent-seeking behavior.3" 3 As the western mining industry declined in relative economic importance, lawmakers could reward
newly dominant constituencies by altering water law. For example, a preference for municipal uses favors those who can capture
local government units to gain control of appropriated water
over those who cannot.
Nevertheless, the Wyoming system lacked an important feature that we might have expected to see: it did not significantly
change the substantive rules of water law, at least at first.30 4 The
first changes affected only who decided rights conflicts and the
level of protection rights would receive against the state. In
short, the Wyoming system substituted a political appointee for
local juries as decision maker and made water rights contingent
on state forebearance, at least on the margins.30 5 This was a remarkable transformation in 1889-90, "a time when the fields of
administrative law and practice in the United States were in their
early stages."3 °6 Both changes enhanced the interests of those
who controlled the levers of power in Wyoming at the expense of
individuals.
The standard account of the Wyoming system stresses its efficiency and technical superiority over the common law system it
replaced. Hutchins, for example, summarized the benefits of
centralization as follows:
It became increasingly evident [in the late nineteenth century]
that if the potential of the West's water resources was to be
realized in the developing economy, something had to be done
about public control of these resources and of their utilization.
Necessarily, efficient public control went beyond legislative
303

See

ANDERSON & SNYDER,

supra note 17, at 59.

Wilkinson, supra note 70, at 10 ("The statutes setting up the water agencies
made essentially no change in the underlying body of law."). Change came later as a
result of the different incentives under the new system. See ANDERSON & SNYDER,
supra note 17, at 54 (describing changes caused by administrative systems).
305 Shifting such decisions to a political body also creates a new set of conflicts
that the common law prevented. Centralization means that one political agent is
responsible for representing multiple interests. "The common law dictates that one
agent may represent multiple principals with conflicting interests only if each principal consents. National usurpation of the agent's role for all of a basin's different
parts conflicts with that very sensible common law doctrine." Haddock, supra note
293, at 50. Haddock's point applies equally well to any centralized system.
304

306 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7. at 301.
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declarations as construed by the courts in individual controversies and as enforced by their decrees. It involved continuing action by the executive arm of the State government,
through the agency of administrative organizations equipped
to find facts and to act upon them. It called for such action by
applying clearly worded directives in exercising the police
power of 30the
7 State for the protection and utilization of public
property.

The efficiency of the resulting water allocation is open to question, of course, both on technical and economic grounds since it
often involves uneconomic public works projects with adverse
environmental consequences. 30 8 Moreover, water law can rely
on local specialized decision makers rather than on the state engineer and thus make use of expertise without centralization.30 9
Local expertise can often be crucial to the success of water-related projects.3 10
Shifting to a regulatory approach had other costs as well. The
transaction costs of innovation now rested on those seeking
change in the institution rather than on those objecting to adaptations.3 11 Parties lacking actual interests at stake were now permitted to involve themselves. 312 The broad class of public choice
problems now attached to the rule generation process.3 13 A dynamic of intervention was created, with the incentives all pointing toward more state involvement rather than less. 3 14 Finally,
Coasean bargaining became more expensive and, in many cases,
impossible because of the mandatory nature of regulatory
schemes.3 1 5
Was the system Mead set up really "central planning?" An
307

Id. at 298.

308 See, e.g., REISNER, supra note 3, at 222 ("Streamflow calculations and reserNo
voir carrying capacity were based on nine months of gauging in a wet year ....

investigation was made of the need for drainage.") (describing the Belle Fourche
project in South Dakota, the Bureau of Reclamation's "preeminent fiasco").
309 See, e.g., Colorado's practice of using various entities to administer the planning system below the state level. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Five Principles That
Define Colorado Water Law, 26 COLO. LAW. 165, 166 (June 1997).
310 See, e.g., REISNER, supra note 3, at 714 (noting that Reclamation Service engi-

neers at the beginning of the 1900s "tended to view themselves as a godlike class
performing hydrologic miracles for grateful simpletons" yet failed to adequately address drainage, soil condition, or economics of projects-information known to the
"grateful simpletons"-and so caused projects to fail).
311 See
312 See
313 See
314 See
315 See

Yandle & Morriss, supra note 11, at 147.

id.
id.
id. at 148.

id.
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1889 letter from Mead to one of his water commissioners makes
clear that Mead was a very modern central planner. The commissioner was instructed to record, and transmit to Mead, "a
complete record of the times and volumes of water allotted to the
various ditches."3'1 6 Mead also instructed his commissioner that
"priority of right does not justify waste and where improper or
wasteful use is observed the supply is to be restricted, 3 17 a position in advance of Mead's authority, since it predates the 1889
constitution.
Like modern central planners, Mead sought to use administrative controls to increase production. Mead's interest in increasing efficiency was clearly aligned with the interests of the large
canal companies in which his patrons were involved. For example, in July 1889 Mead cosigned with Joseph Carey and J.A.
Johnston a letter to a congressional committee considering irrigation legislation that argued that
[i]f this Territory could, during the past five years have controlled the disposal of the irrigable lands within its borders, it
could, while disposing of it to actual settlers only, have afforded such protection to canal companies as would have
given our agriculture four times its present importance and
more than doubled our population. Instead of this, there have
been repeated instances where arbitrary and unreasonable rulings have subjected our people to heavy and wholly unnecessary expense and to cause the whole land policy to be
regarded as oppressive.3 18
Mead's system, although predating the ideological apparatus
of modern central economic planning, was thus clearly a central
planning system for water.
D.

The Spread of the Wyoming System

The two initial elements of the Wyoming system with which we
are concerned here spread quickly across the West, moving water
rights issues out of the general court system and into specialized
systems of adjudication, and redefining water rights as state316 Letter from Elwood Mead to Water Commissioner, Dist. No. 1, at 1 (Mar. 27,
1889) (on file with the Wyo. State Archives, Cheyenne, Wyo., Laramie Clerk of Dist.
Ct., Water Records, Box 1, Folder: "Water Commissioners General Correspondence, 1887-1902").
317 Id. at 2.

318 Letter 3 (July 31, 1889) (on file with the Wyo. State Archives, Cheyenne, Wyo.,

Laramie Clerk of Dist. Ct., Water Records, Box 1, File: "Water Commissioners'
General Correspondence. 1887-1902").
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owned property.3 1 9
The shift to administrative control took place slowly at first
and then began to spread relatively quickly. Nebraska followed
Wyoming in 1895. In the decade after 1900 eight more states followed suit. 320 By 1920, only Montana and Colorado maintained
nonadministrative approaches.32 1 Why the sudden change? A
key factor in promoting the shift was the federal government's
insistence on "reform" of water rights laws as a condition for access to federal reclamation funds after the passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902.322 To the extent that federal water programs
were both truly "inevitable ' 323 and inevitably centralized, movement to planning may have itself been inevitable. Notably, public money was not necessary to the creation of at least some
infrastructure for water-during the mid-nineteenth century extensive privately funded infrastructure was built across the
West.3 24 Rather than reacting to local demands for rationalizing
chaotic water rights systems, the shift thus appears to be in part
the result of pressure from Washington, D.C.
Common law water rights adjudication also failed to meet the
needs of water bureaucrats because it could not provide the information needed for planners to plan. The information demands of water planning are quite high. 325 Interestingly, of the
fifteen western states that followed Wyoming's lead to centralize
decision making, only Nebraska, Nevada, and Texas followed
Wyoming all the way to full integration of water rights into the
administrative systems. The others retained a greater role for the
courts,3 26 suggesting that Wyoming went well beyond the point of
319 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 301.
320 See id. (Idaho, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah ).
321 Wilkinson, supra note 70, at 8-9; see also I HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 301
(Arizona, California, Kansas, Texas, and Washington all adopted centralized systems
in 1910-1919.).
322 Wilkinson, supra note 70, at 8. Federal influence's general role has been to
"break apart the foundation for an effective system of water rights." ANDERSON &
SNYDER, supra note 17, at 60.
323 REISNER, supra note 3, at 110-11 (claiming that the Reclamation Act of 1902
was "inevitable" by end of nineteenth century).

324 See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 17, at 35-43 (describing various forms

of private financing).
325 See, e.g., Krogh, supra note 16, at 13-14 (describing information needs for
planning).
326 See 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 302-03. Nevada and Texas later retreated

from the Wyoming model. Id. at 303.
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diminishing returns in adopting such an extensive program of
centralization.
The notion of public ownership of water resources also spread
rapidly. Sixteen western states lay claim to their water resources
in their state constitutions 327 or water codes. 328 This change
seems to have been an insignificant part of the debate. "In the
1880s and 1890s, American debates about water law were not
about government licensing versus private rights. Little attention
was paid to this dichotomy. 3 29 Nonetheless, water rights held by
sufferance from the state are quite different from property rights.
As Scott and Coustalin point out,
[wihere previously the holder held his water right, like his
right to his farm, as an interest good against the government
and all the world, he now held it of an administrative agency
on behalf of the government, which typically claimed powers
to control 33rights
of ownership over all waters in its
0
jurisdiction.

327 See Table 2 infra; see also ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 13 (stating that all waters are "reserved to the people for common use" subject to appropriation); CoLo.
CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (declaring water of every natural stream "the property of the
public" and subject to appropriation); MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(3) (maintaining
that water is property of "the state for the use of its people"); NEB. CONST. art. XV,
§ 5 (positing that water of natural streams' use is "dedicated to the people"); N.M.
CONST. art. XVI, § 2 (declaring that unappropriated water "belong[s] to the public"); WYo. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (noting that water is "property of the state").
328 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141A (West 1994) (stating that waters "belong to
the public and are subject to appropriation"): CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971)
(maintaining that water is "the property of the people" but may be acquired by
appropriation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702 (1998) (dedicating water "to the use of
the people"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.025 (Michie 1995) (noting that water
"belongs to the public"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01 (1995) (declaring that waters

"belong to the public" and are subject to appropriation); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.110
(1999) (stating that water "belongs to the public"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 46-1-3
(Michie 1999) (declaring water "the property of the public" and can be appropriated); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021 (Vernon 2000) (proclaiming water "the
property of the state"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-I-I (1953) (pronouncing all waters
"the property of the public"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.010 (West 1992) (noting that subject to existing rights, waters "belong to the public").
329 Scott & Coustalin, supra note 51, at 913. Catherine Miller argues that labeling

water as public property "did confer important ideological incentives and power on
those seeking access to a limited resource." MILLER, supra note 49, at 5.
330 Scott & Coustalin, supra note 51, at 915. One example of the difference can

be seen in the impact of statutory schemes for registering water rights claims. In
states where water rights were based on appropriation, water claims could make use
of registration schemes to improve the quality of proof, but unregistered appropriations could still produce property rights if other proof was adequate. See, e.g., Murray v. Tingley, 50 P. 723, 725 (Mont. 1897) (noting that in enacting a registration law
"the legislature did not contemplate that one who failed to comply with the terms of
the statute, but who, in the absence of any conflicting adverse right, had nevertheless
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Interestingly, Scott and Coustalin found that such water law
reforms in common law jurisdictions ' "hardly
ever seem to im3 31
prove the security of title in the user."
One result of this shift has been the capture of water rights law
by special interests in a number of states. The evolution of statutory water law has not continued, despite the failure of courts to
protect statutory water rights as property against changes on the
margins:
Existing water users enjoy significant political power; they are
the victors of the transformative economy and have the resources and connections necessary to kill off serious legislative
threats. Existing users are further aided in their efforts to defeat new initiatives because the public frequently refuses to
pay for new legislative endeavors, even when the public
strongly favors and values the effort.3 32
This continues to be true today: Reed Benson, the director of
an Oregon environmental group, recently documented the capture of water law by special interests in Washington, Oregon,
Idaho, and Montana, concluding that "[i]n general, existing water
users in the Northwest have been remarkably successful at continuing their established practices even where these practices violate venerable principles of western water law, and even though
applying that law would often benefit other interests. 3 33 Indeed,
Wyoming provides one of the most striking examples of the creation of a special interest group through the administrative allocation system. Wyoming allocated to existing water users
proportionate shares in "excess water" not already claimed. In
1985, Wyoming granted all those holding water rights additional
rights to one cubic foot per second for each seventy acres of
land.33 4
The ability of existing users to privilege their uses over the requirements of the law is accomplished by a number of means. In
actually diverted water and put it to a beneficial use, should acquire no title
thereby"); De Necochea v. Curtis, 22 P. 198, 199 (Cal. 1889) (similar construction).
331 Scott & Coustalin, supra note 51, at 828; see also Thompson, supra note 104,
at 7 (noting that "water users often do not trust" governments on water rights issues
because "[o]ver the past several decades, the government has changed and reallocated water rights in a number of important ways to meet environmental and other
goals").
332 Thompson. supra note 295, at 374.
333 Reed D. Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: Protecting Established Water
Uses in the Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of PriorAppropriation, 28 ENVTL. L.
881, 911 (1998).
334 See WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-329 to 41-4-331 (Michie 2001).
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some cases, the existing users rely on legislative actions. For example, Benson concluded that the "Idaho Legislature has . . .
acted repeatedly to legitimize existing, otherwise illegal irrigation
uses through the Snake River Basin Adjudication."33' 5 In others,
the existing users rely on capture of agencies. The northwestern
states, for example, do not enforce their water codes without a
complaint from users3 36 and often lack the resources to police
their systems adequately.3 37
IV
THE COMMON LAW AND THE WYOMING
SYSTEM COMPARED

There are important similarities between the western states'
common law of water and the administrative systems that supplanted it. Like the common law, the statutory systems are generally vague on key terms, many of which were borrowed directly
from the common law. Few states define beneficial use, for example, and "there seems to be little significant variation among
the states in the general interpretation and application of the
beneficial use doctrine."3'3 8
The differences overwhelm the similarities, however. First, the
common law of water rights puts decisions as to the facts of disputes into the hands of juries, not bureaucrats. Although jurors
may be assisted by expert testimony at trial, juries, of course, lack
the potential for consistent expertise theoretically possible in a
bureaucracy with respect to scientific and engineering questions.3 39 Juries also lack, however, the incentive structure of
those same bureaucrats. 34 0 As a result, while an individual jury
may "run away" and render an unacceptable verdict in a particular case, juries as a whole are unlikely to veer consistently in a
335 Benson, supra note 333, at 896.
336 Id. at 890 ("[A]I1 four states take enforcement action against water users almost exclusively in response to complaints from other users.").
337 Id. at 894 ("Despite increasing pressures on water resources in the 1990s, none
of the state legislatures have provided any significant increases in agency enforcement resources.").
338 Neuman, supra note 64, at 925.

339 See, e.g., Krogh, supra note 16, at 20 (vesting of water rights questions "in an
agency with specialized knowledge and expertise as to water rights" is one of "two
principal advantages" of an administrative system).

340 See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 17, at 21 ("Politicians and bureaucrats

face incentives that are very different from those in the private sector, but those
incentives are no less important to outcomes.").
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particular direction unless potential jurors perceive themselves as
having a consistent interest in the outcomes of water cases.3 4 1 In
contrast, centralized water rights systems concentrate power,
prompting today the labeling of a state engineer as "the most
powerful person in the state."3 4 Indeed, the correspondence of
the water commissioners shows the impact of the changes. An
1894 letter from a landowner to a water commissioner, for example, complained that his water had been cut off despite there being only one right prior to his, so that the city of Cheyenne,
which had no right to appropriate, could have the water.34 3
Rather than seek judicial relief for this infringement of property
rights, however, the landowner was reduced to asking after the
fact for an explanation of why his water was taken from him.
Second, the common law of water rights developed incrementally and through a decentralized process of choosing disputes for adjudication rather than as a result of centralized
allocation of decision-making resources. Actual disputes, not bureaucratic priorities, created the pressure for changing rules.
This made the common law system more resistant to capture by
special interests. In addition, requiring an actual solution to a
real problem forces the courts to "formulate solutions appropriately grounded in context. ' 344 Even where states rely on adjudicatory mechanisms as part of their administrative schemes to
resolve conflicts in rights, the adjudications are significantly different from common law trials. In such administrative proceedings the state is present as a party, technical advisor to the court,
or administrative fact finder.3 45
Third, the common law's incrementalism allows it to adapt its
rules to new needs and circumstances. 346 Statutory and administrative schemes, on the other hand, require due process for
341 Thus in products liability cases, for example, some have suggested that jurors
are more likely to see themselves as potential future victims of product-related injuries than as potential defendants in such suits. To the extent that water law disputes
are determined by jurors from communities of users with heterogeneous interests,
this should not be a significant factor in water rights cases.
342 REISNER, supra note 3. at 11.
343 Letter from M.G. Manley to Water Commissioner for Crow Creek 1 (May 18,
1894) (on file with the Wyo. State Archives, Laramie, Wyo., Laramie Clerk of Dist.
Ct., Water Records, Box 1, Folder: Water Commission, General Correspondence,
1887-1902).
344 Thompson, supra note 295, at 376.
345 Neuman, supra note 64, at 926.
346 Even proponents of the "public" nature of water rights implicitly recognize

this. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 295, at 376 (noting that Joseph Sax's early
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changes and so are less flexible and tend to change in a discontinuous manner. Where new facts produce new questions, there is
often "no direct, determinant link between power and the outcome of any particular conflict. '3 4 7 Political control of resources,
on the other hand, "exacerbates conflict and encourages waste in
the decision-making process. '34 8 Further, it enables mistakes to
take place on a grander scale. Thus, the scientific mistake that
rain would "follow the plough" became entrenched in federal
homestead policy in the arid West, with disastrous consequences.3 4 9
Which system is better? One criticism of the common law system was that the decentralized and piecemeal resolution of disputes meant that rights were uncertain. Until a water rights
holder had litigated against all possible other claimants, for example, it was not certain that his rights would prevail. The practical impact of this seems likely to have been minimally based on
the experience of the courts in dealing with water law claims, as
expressed in the opinions surveyed for this article, and by the
broader review of water law around the world conducted by
Scott and Coustalin. They concluded that
the weight of seniority and increasing domain of prescriptive
rights made court rulings on rights disputes predictable and
certain. While water users under nineteenth and twentieth
century common law have never had a 'quality of title' to
equal that of freehold 350
land users, their title has been found to
be surprisingly robust.
Moreover, common law rights were, once determined, certain.
Administrative rights are not. Hutchins, for example, concludes
that administrative systems "accord to no one the unqualified
right to appropriate water."'3 51 Not only are there various restrictions on approval of applications but "there are some provisions
for taking possession of existing senior rights to the use of water
for low preference purposes, in order that they may be exercised
environmental writings "constitute a plea to the courts (whether or not intended by
Sax) to persist in their common law role of adapter").
347 MILLER, supra note 49, at 176 (describing the Miller & Lux Cattle Company's

experience in water law in California courts).
348 Anderson & Hill, supra note 66, at xiv; see also Korr, supra note 260, at 314

(describing failure of attempts at instituting planning regimes in California in 1880s
due to political fights for control of water law).
349 See REISNER, supra note 3, at 5.

350 Scott & Coustalin, supra note 51, at 828.
351 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 7, at 400.
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352
by junior appropriators for high preference purposes.
A second criticism is that formal court proceedings are "unnecessary and wasteful" for adjudicating "[t]he vast majority of
water rights" which "can and do proceed to final determination
without dispute. ' 35 3 Of course, under the common law only contested rights would be subject to litigation; undisputed rights between parties could be memorialized with contracts. Only in a
system mandating that all rights be adjudicated, such as a central
planning system, would the additional expense of adjudicating
uncontested rights be necessary. Although not conclusive proof,
the opinions in water law cases in Montana and Wyoming do not
appear to have been significantly different than opinions in other
areas by those courts.
A third criticism is that decentralized water rights systems
"waste" water compared to a hypothetical optimal allocation
produced by central planning. William Hammond Hall, California State Engineer in the 1880s and a frustrated planner, complained, for example, that "[t]he State by throwing open the
waters of her streams to appropriation has directly laid the foundation for their wasteful and injudicial use, and wrangling over
their distribution from their natural channels. 35 4 This criticism
is not unlike those made in modern neoclassical economic theory
in which an omniscient central planner's solution to an optimization problem is compared to market solutions, which are then
found wanting. Like those models, the "waste" critique is correct
when comparing the two static outcomes. It neglects, however,
two crucial features of the real world: the dynamic nature of resource use and the lack of omniscience by central planners.
Water use, even if optimized today, must change tomorrow to
remain optimal. A planned solution is thus unable to remain optimal without continual readjustment. Market solutions, on the
other hand, allow for continuous adjustment without central intervention. Reaching a planned optimum requires a great deal of
information to be available to the planner. Markets, by contrast,
allow decentralized processing of information.
For example, consider the "use it or lose it" rule common to
prior appropriation systems. Such a rule is likely to produce
waste as rights holders use water merely to preserve their

Id.
353 Krogh, supra note 16, at 21.
354 Korr, supra note 260, at 308 (quoting Hammond).
352
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rights-yet when combined with transferable water rights, the inefficiencies disappear. A rights holder faced with the need to
"use it or lose it" can simply transfer his rights to a user with a
higher valuation for the water than the wasteful alternative use.
And with the common law's ability to adapt to new facts, new
uses like in-stream flow can be recognized.
If we focus on facilitating private transactions involving water,
we can also compare the two systems. Private transactions require private property rights. "Because rights cannot be per355
fectly enforced, ownership will always be probabilistic.
Greater certainty promotes more attention to capturing the benefits of ownership.3 5 6 Scott and Coustalin suggest six characteristics of property rights that can be used to evaluate the two
systems: "duration or permanence; flexibility; exclusivity or specificity; quality of title or security; transferability or assignability;
and divisibility." 35 7 Assuming that allowing some degree of markets and property rights is the means to accomplish the allocation
of water, how well do the two systems stack up?
Duration. The common law system recognized property rights
in the conventional sense. The central planning system made
rights less secure against legislative attacks on the margin.
Flexibility. The common law demonstrated a flexible, fact-specific approach to applying water law principles. The central planning approach set its dictates in statutes and regulations,
reducing flexibility.
Exclusivity. Common law water rights were property rights,
enforced against specific claimants in court and potentially good
against the entire world. Central planning rights are shared with
the planning agency and the legislature.3 5 8
355 ANDERSON

&

SNYDER,

supra note 17, at 23.

356 Id.

357 Scott & Coustalin, supra note 51, at 823.
358 The shift to central planning was justified, in part, by claims that it would be
more effective at cataloging and distributing water rights. Thus, Elwood Mead had
claimed that many bodies of water in Wyoming were overappropriated under the
common law system. Whether this claim has been borne out by practice is unclear
and a worthy topic for future research-a 1995 study in Colorado found that none of
919 (out of a population of 1,053) water transfer decrees filed with the Colorado
State Engineer before 1969 contained a volumetric limitation on the water rights
after the transfer, 814 had no flow rate limits, 906 had no seasonal limits, and 810
had neither flow or seasonal limits. James N. Corbirdge, Jr., Historical Water Use
and the Protection of Vested Rights: A Challenge for Colorado Water Law, 69 U.
CoLO. L. REV. 503, 514 (1998) (citing Joe Tom Wood, HAPPY BIRTHDAY, ORR
(1995)).
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Quality of title. Planned systems of water rights can provide
high quality title to water. Title, under such systems may be
equal to that under the appropriative system, especially if the
planned system devotes resources to monitoring the rights. On
the other hand, such systems provide instruments of unpredictable government water policy changes that can easily upset and
erode the 'quality' of individual licenses and permits.3 5 9
Transferability. Common law rights were quickly recognized
as transferable. Central planning rights depend on planners' acquiescence in transfers, raising transactions costs.
Divisibility. The hallmark of common law property rights is
their ready divisibility. Property rights in land have been split
into uncountable combinations. The same is potentially true of
common law water rights, although their development was cut
short before this could occur. Central planning rights require
planners' acquiescence to division and so raise the transactions
costs of division.
Another issue is how the system will deal with changes in use
patterns. In recent years in-stream uses have increasingly been
recognized as valuable (promoting fish populations for species
preservation and tourism, for example). Similarly, population
growth in the West has made water for urban uses increasingly
valuable. How would the two systems react to these changes?
The common law system of secure property rights would require new users to purchase senior rights through voluntary
transactions to shift the use. As new uses became more valuable,
the gains from trade would increase. So long as legal barriers did
not restrict trades (e.g. by failing to recognize in stream uses as
"beneficial uses") or impose significant transactions costs (e.g. by
taxing transfers), an increase in value of alternative uses would
produce increased trades. The sale of the senior rights' holders'
rights would lead to a wealth transfer from the purchasers to the
rights' holders.
Under the central planning system, the increase in value might
also lead to trades. Trades would require planners' acquiescence,
however, raising the transactions costs of trading and so reducing
its frequency. Moreover, those seeking transfers would have an
alternative to purchasing rights. Senior rights' holders could be
attacked in the legislature or courts, as well as persuaded to
359 Scott & Coustalin, supra note 51, at 832.

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80, 2001]

trade.3 6 ° Similarly, junior rights holders have attacked the seniority principle in the legislatures.36 '
The crucial insight here is that under the common law system
there would be no planning; uses would be determined by the
private transactions of individuals. In a sense, that stands the
usual analysis of nineteenth-century common law on its head:
modern water law scholars often attribute to nineteenth-century
judges a desire to maximize wealth, encourage economic development or further other policy goals. 36 2 Nineteenth-century
Americans, including judges, were undoubtedly concerned about
economic growth. That does not mean, however, that they
shaped water law to accomplish economic policy ends.
The common law of water rights was just that-a law of property rights. As a result its rules could often appear rigid and inflexible. Indeed, modern critics also complain that the common
law's legacy is a set of rules that do not allow for consideration of
what the modern critics consider important policy objectives.3 6 3
A system built around property rights also creates different incentives for decision makers.
Private entrepreneurs provide new goods and services only if
the benefits from those goods and services exceed the costs of the
resources used in production. And with well-specified property
rights, the supplier will pay the costs and capture the profits. On
360 Anderson & Hill, supra note 65, at xiv (stating that when water is valuable,
"competing parties invest large amounts of time and effort into influencing the political process"); Scott & Coustalin, supra note 51, at 918 ("As water has become valuable, it has become less costly for challengers to directly attack existing titles in the
courts and tribunals and indirectly in legislative committees and administrative
agencies. Users are now vulnerable to legal reductions in their entitlement which
would have been unthinkable in the past.").
361 See Scott & Coustalin, supra note 51, at 919.
362 See, e.g., McCurdy, supra note 64, at 257 (noting that under Stephen Field,
California Supreme Court "wove" its "policy concerns into legal doctrine").
363 Professor Eric Freyfogle, for example, is critical of the California Supreme
Court's decision in Lux v. Haggin for failing to address policy concerns: "The court
in Lux failed to ask many questions that we today would ask if similarly engaged in
the task of shaping a water law system. It failed to consider policy factors and legal
options we would find influential." Freyfogle, supra note 26, at 487-88. Freyfogle
concludes that
[c]onsidered from a policy perspective, Lux is hard to understand. How
could a court so clearly faced with the chance to bring order to the California water system so blithely refuse the task? ...

Lux cannot properly be

understood from a policy perspective, nor can the other leading water law
decisions of the late nineteenth century.
Id. at 524.
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the other hand, politicians or bureaucrats who provide goods and
services to interest groups in the political sector do not directly
face the costs of supply.3 64
Turning resources like water over to political decision makers
shifts decisions into an incentive structure in which decision makers do not bear the costs of their decisions.36 5
What was the cost of centralization for Wyoming? What negative consequences does central planning have for water rights in
Wyoming, the Wyoming economy, or for the West as a whole?
These are difficult empirical questions, which for the most part
must await further research. What I have argued here is that the
result of central planning for water has been a less adaptive, less
flexible system that cannot provide an outcome as efficient as a
decentralized, market-based approach. The size and scope of inefficiencies must await further work.
V
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE: MAKING
MARKETS POSSIBLE

What lessons can be drawn from the disparate developments in
water law in Montana and Wyoming? Certainly a historical lesson can be learned--the standard account of the development of
the Wyoming system leaves out much of the relevant political
detail. Rather than an efficiency-oriented reform aimed at producing order out of chaos by reducing the common law to an
364 ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 17, at 26.

365 Marc Reisner's account of the behavior of a Bureau of Reclamation bureaucrat, Mike Strauss, gives a good example of the incentive problems for central planners. In the early 1950s, Straus had failed to reconfirm his ticket on an airline flight,
as was required. The flight was overbooked and Straus should have been bumped
from the flight. When asked to leave the plane, however, "Straus refused to budge;
he pretended not to hear." Eventually a volunteer was found to get off the plane.
"But Strauss appeared unmoved; he wasn't even embarrassed. 'It didn't faze him a
bit,' said a Reclamation man who was with him. 'He thought he was performing the
greatest work in the country, and he felt like the holiest bureaucrat in the land."'
REISNER, supra note 3, at 138. Bureaucrats' incentive problems go well beyond

forcing others to bear the inconveniences of the bureaucrat's failure to act responsibly, but the same sense of "holiness" that allows a bureaucrat to displace a passenger on a plane also allows decisions on a larger scale to be made without regard to
the consequences for even large numbers of individuals. Thus, Reisner concludes
that the Bureau of Reclamation, "almost as soon as it was created" as the Reclamation Service, "found itself working on behalf of the wealthy and powerful and
against the interests of the constituency it was created to protect, the small western
irrigation farmer." Id. at 102.
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engineering scheme, the Wyoming system was the result of the
capture of a well-meaning reformer by politically powerful interests. Direct allocation of rights is obviously subject to political
influence;3 66 indirect influences introduced through planning
schemes can be as well.
More generally, we can learn an important lesson about the
importance of decentralized institutions like the common law in
preserving political freedom. Law is more than a set of rules, it is
also a network of institutions that both create and enforce the
rules. "Engineering" approaches to legal reform can have unintended consequences far beyond their immediate reach. It is no
small irony that Elwood Mead, whose career was built around an
ideology that glorified yeoman farmers,3 67 played such a significant role in designing an institution aimed at eradicating them
from Wyoming. The nineteenth-century water law systems can
therefore teach us valuable lessons about how we should approach problems today that cry out for "engineering" solutions.
Moreover, the values that such solutions aim to introduce into
the law can often be obtained in other ways. Thus, the expertise
of specialists in state agencies can be made available to courts in
a variety of ways: expert testimony, formal intervention, amici
briefs, and official reports, to name but a few.36 8
Many modern environmental problems are described in terms
reminiscent of those used to describe water rights in the nineteenth century. Greenhouse gas emissions, urban sprawl, water
pollution, endangered species protection, and countless others
are all described in effect as commons in need of reengineering.
Since 1970, the beginning of the "modern" era of environmental
legislation, American law has been moving steadily away from
the common law approach and toward central planning in these
areas-even as central planning has been revealed as a spectacular failure in the rest of the world. The story of water rights sug366 See ANDERSON & SNYDER, supra note 17, at 59 ("Perhaps the most obvious

example of rent seeking occurs when allocative decisions are placed in the hands of
a state agency or a court.").
367 Of course, his later attempts at central planning of farming communities
hardly had beneficial impacts on the yeomen farmers for whom he was trying to
plan. See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 44, at 85-101 (describing Mead's failure at cre-

ating collective farms in California after World War I).
368 Note that I am not recommending that agencies be empowered to make initial
factual findings. See Krogh, supra note 16, at 30 (describing how "integrated" systems of water rights rely on state agencies to prepare reports "that form[ ] the basis
for a later judicial determination of water rights").
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gests that this process should not go unchallenged by those who
care about the environment.
In doing so, however, proponents of the common law, markets,
and private property as institutions capable of addressing these
problems must be ready to combat the view that all institutional
structures are equally zero-sum games. Catherine Miller expresses this idea in her conclusion to her account of the Miller &
Lux Cattle Company's decades of water rights litigation: "The
laws governing resources are inexorably linked to economic
power. Privatization, like the earlier call for government action,
is but a mechanism to transfer wealth, another call to subsidize
one group of claimants at the expense of another."3 6' 9 Miller's
conclusion accurately describes the "Wyoming System" of central planning; it does not accurately portray the decentralized
alternative.
To the contrary, the combination of common law, markets, and
private property is not linked, inexorably or otherwise, to economic power. Rather it is the framework, and perhaps the only
framework, that allows for the development of a spontaneous order in which economic power cannot control events. 370 This is
the most important lesson of the development of western water
law, and it is central to the development of water markets today.
Five characteristics of the western common law of prior appropriation could play an important part in developing water institutions elsewhere. First, the common law conserved scarce legal
resources. It did so by reducing the number of disputes that had
to be resolved (only actual disputes rather than all possible disputes, as would be necessary to fully allocate a resource) and by
developing rules only as needed. This is an important feature for
areas where legal resources are scarce. As Paul Rubin has noted,
devoting legislators' time to developing comprehensive codes
often diverts the attention of the few legally trained individuals
in a transitional society into less productive areas.3 71
Second, the common law developed rules incrementally. Not
only did this conserve legal resources, but it allowed the law to
develop based only on the flash points of actual disputes. The
development of the law thus took place first in those areas with
supra note 49, at 185.
370 See Thompson, supra note 104, at 1 (describing benefits of markets for water
rights).
369 MILLER,

371 See Rubin, supra note 92, at 10-11.
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disputes, an efficient allocation of legal resources. Moreover, the
incremental, dispute-based resolution of disputes helped prevent
capture of the rule-making institutions.
Third, the common law was a fact-based rule generation mechanism. Relying on the facts of actual disputes helps even the
playing field between individuals and organized interests in several ways. Fact-based dispute resolution, as opposed to legislative development of rules, concentrates the decision maker on
local knowledge, an area where individuals have a comparative
advantage over special interests. An organized interest group
may be able to marshal impressive resources to persuade a policymaker, but those resources are less effective in a tribunal that
must determine which person owns a particular property right.
Fact-based rule generation also at least partially unlinks the determination of rules from the agendas of interest groups. A legislature might be persuaded to tackle a specific area, but a court
can only decide issues before it as the result of actual disputes.
Fourth, the western experience provides examples of specific
procedural devices that reduce proof and transaction costs. Registries for rights claims, for example, provide cheap and objective proof of claims. Rules like seniority simplify dispute
resolution.
Fifth, fairness and recognition of customary rights is crucial to
acceptance of a rights allocation system. The common law of
prior appropriation succeeded in part because it rested on a simple idea that people widely viewed as fair.
The danger is that "reformers" will push developing countries
to adopt inappropriate institutions out of a misguided zeal for the
technical sophistication of comprehensive solutions. This is a
real fear-economists sometimes fail to appreciate the importance of indigenous institutions and rely instead on "proven" sets
of rules from other cultures.3 7 2 Copying a set of laws that "work"
in one country into another country's legal system may satisfy an
institutional lender's desire for clarity while destabilizing existing
institutions that served to protect customary rights.37 3
The reform this suggests is simple. Nations interested in im372 See, e.g., Rudiger Dornbusch, Strategies and Prioritiesfor Reform, in 1 THE

169 (Paul Marer & Salvatore Zecchini eds., 1991) (advocating adoption of foreign legal codes by transition
TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY: THE BROAD ISSUES

economies).
373 On the impact of copying legal institutions generally, see
GAL TRANSPLANTS (2d ed. 1993).

ALAN WATSON, LE-
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proving their prospects for adequate water for growing populations need to develop a means to recognize the customary water
rights that currently exist, reduce the transaction costs of trading
those rights, and enforce voluntary agreements for trade. Doing
so may require little more than accepting that some water rights
disputes are best left to customary legal institutions or, where
such institutions have been decimated by state action, providing
an alternative enforcement mechanism. It does not require
drafting comprehensive water codes, establishing central planning agencies, or attempting to allocate all water resources.
Anderson and Snyder subtitled their book on developing
water markets "Priming the Invisible Pump." This phrase captures the essence of the common law's contribution to the development of appropriate institutions. The structures needed are
invisible in many ways, they operate in the background. Rather
than directly allocating rights or establishing a planning body to
make the rights allocations more "efficient" or more "fair," the
common law allowed individual actions to determine rights allocations by providing a framework for recognizing those actions.
The gain, however, was that the "invisible pump" was indeed
primed and began to deliver water where it was needed.
It may be that the specific rules of prior appropriation fit the
needs of other societies as well as the American West. Or they
may not. The institution of the common law, however, surely fits
the needs of a diverse set of societies facing water crises, real or
potential. Precisely because it cannot implement "The Plan," the
common law can create the opportunity for individuals to each
implement their own plans for water and for their lives.
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Peterson, 1 Mont. 561 (1872); 1874: Barkley v. Tieleke, 2 Mont. 59 (1874); 1878:
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Floyd v. Boulder Flume & Mercantile Co., 28 P. 450 (Mont. 1892); Quigley v.
Birdseye, 28 P. 741 (Mont. 1892); Raymond v. Wimsette, 31 P. 537 (Mont. 1892);
Salazar v. Smart, 30 P. 676 (Mont. 1892); 1894: Crawford v. Minnesota & Montana
Land and Improvement Co., 38 P. 713 (Mont. 1894); Creek v. Bozeman Water
Works Co., 38 P. 459 (Mont. 1894); Kleinschmidt v. Greiser, 37 P. 5 (Mont. 1894);
Johnson v. Bielenberg, 37 P. 12 (Mont. 1894); 1895: Middle Creek Ditch Co. v.
Henry, 39 P. 1054 (Mont. 1895); Beatty v. Murray Placer Mining Co., 39 P. 82
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